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Power dictates the allocation of, and access to, valued resources. It is perhaps not 
surprising then that people have a µwill¶ or µlust¶ for power (Nietzsche, 1924; Russel, 1938), 
and believe that power is exciting and powerlessness depressing (Mondillon et al., 2005). The 
Approach-Inhibition Theory of Power echoes this belief, suggesting that high power brings 
positive mood and low power negative mood (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). 
However, empirical data on power and mood is mixed. Inducing feelings of power sometimes 
elevates mood (e.g., Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), but other times does not (e.g., 
Berdahl & Martorana, 2006), suggesting that the relationship between power and mood may 
be more complex than initially thought.  
The Situated Model of Power argues that the relationship between power and mood is 
dependent on the context (Guinote, 2007a). In this view, power attunes people to the current 
situation, elevating mood in positive contexts and depressing mood in negative contexts. This 
implies that power increases variability in mood between contexts of opposing valence 
(negative vs. positive; Guinote, 2007a), and is consistent with the fact that power increases 
variability in thought and behaviour (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002). 
Five studies, informed by the Approach-Inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003) and Situated 
(Guinote, 2007a) Models of Power, looked at the impact of high and low power on self-
reports, and physiological indices, of mood at baseline and in contexts of differing valence 
(negative vs. positive). A meta-analysis revealed that across studies (N = 1046) high power 
elevated, and low power depressed mood at baseline/in neutral and in positive contexts. 
However, neither high nor low power predicted mood in negative contexts. Furthermore, high 
power increased, and low power decreased variability in mood across contexts (although the 
former effect was marginally significant). Results reconcile disparate findings and are 






CHAPTER 1: POWER 
1.1. Overview 
Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of the literature on power. The first section 
presents a brief historical synopsis before discussing definitions of power. Next, prominent 
empirical work on power is considered. Lastly, theories of power are introduced, including 
the Power as Control, Approach-Inhibition, Social Distance, Situated and Disinhibition 
Models of Power.  
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1.2. A Historical Perspective 
Interest in power can be traced back to time in antiquity. Greek philosophers 
documented their intuitions regarding the psychological effects of power. For example, 
Sophocles states: ³7\UDQQ\LVLQPDQ\WKLQJVKDSS\²especially in its being possible for it to 
do and say what it wishes´ (Penner, 1991, p. 149). Interest in power is also evident in the 
Renaissance, where prominent thinkers explored the moral implications of power and 
powerlessness. Machiavelli (1532/2011) argued power-holders ought to be brutal and 
coercive when necessary. Similar aphorisms can be found in modern philosophy. Nietzsche 
(1924) thought that a person¶V position of power motivated him to hold different (and 
oftentimes illegitimate) moral values, and that replacing these values with one¶VRZQZDVWKH 
mark of a strong-willed individual. ,QVSLUHGE\1LHW]VFKH¶VJHQHDORJLFDODSSURDFK)RXFDXOW
(1980) analysed the role of power in various social institutions (e.g., prison system, home), 
establishing the concept of power within everyday life. Indeed, there is now a sense that 
power is pervasive (Guinote & Vescio, 2010), arising in most relationships, between parents 
and children, teachers and students, line-managers and employees, and policemen and 
citizens. Some scholars have even argued that power is a fundamental µODZ¶ of social 
dynamics (Russel, 1938), suggesting that power is a ubiquitous and central psychological 
construct. 
The intellHFWXDOUDGLFDOLVPRIWKH¶V sparked a scientific interest in the 
psychology of power. Empirical work began with attempts to account for the bases of social 
power (French & Raven, 1959), outline the motivation to power (Winter, 1988), and to 
integrate WKHFRQFHSWVRIµDXWKRULW\¶DQGµOHJLWLPDF\¶XQGHUthe umbrella of power and 
dependence (Emerson, 1962). LDWHUZRUNDVNHGWKHTXHVWLRQ³'oes power corrupt?´ Kipnis 
(1972) observed that power was associated with greater use of harsh negotiation tactics and 
less appreciation for subordinates. However, following the now infamous µobedience¶ 
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(Milgram, 1963) and µprison¶ studies (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), interest in power 
waned in favour of concepts such as legitimacy, conformity, authority and social identity. 
A renewed interest in power emerged some decades later with an influential paper on 
power and stereotyping (Fiske, 1993). A socio-cognitive approach to power arose, in which 
the psychological concomitants of power took centre stage. Scholars began to document the 
effects of power in numerous domains, including: social perception (Fiske & Dépret, 1996), 
cognition (P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006), behaviour (Galinsky et al., 2003), motivation 
(Guinote, 2007c), subjective experiences (Weick & Guinote, 2008) and health (Scheepers, de 
Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2012). As such, power is now a pervasive concept across social 
psychology, referenced in relation to both intrapersonal (e.g., impression formation, 
motivation, action and health) and interpersonal (e.g., morality, legitimacy, leadership and 






(Russel, 1938, p. 18). This encompasses the ability to control others (i.e., allocate rewards 
and punishments) and the ability to control the self and the environment (i.e., determine 
personally relevant rewards and punishments). A similar distinction is made between power 
over and power to (Overbeck & Park, 2001). Power over (or social power) refers to control or 
domination of others. Power to (or personal power) UHIHUVWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVRQDODELOLW\
to bring about intended outcomes (see Lammers, Stoker, Rink, & Galinsky, 2016; van Dijke 
& Popper, 2006), and is closely related to the constructs of autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2010), 
competence (White, 1959) and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982). It is important to note that 
although social and personal power are conceptually distinct, they should not be thought of as 
orthogonal. For example, gaining access to rewards valued by others (i.e., an increase in 
social power) does not necessarily increase personal power, but being subject to another 
perVRQ¶VZLOOLVW\SLFDOO\GHWULPHQWDOWRSHUVRQDOSRZHU(for a review see Leach, Weick, & 
Lammers, 2017). The following work is largely concerned with social power. 
Social power is relational. $QLQGLYLGXDO¶Vpower is not solely a function their own 
capacities (Emerson, 1962; French & Raven, 1959), but is a function of their relative 
capacities compared to others (Guinote & Vescio, 2010). The relational nature of power is 
present in numerous definitions of power (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959)5XVVHOOVWDWHV³$KDV
PRUHSRZHUWKDQ%LI$DFKLHYHVPDQ\LQWHQGHGHIIHFWVDQG%RQO\DIHZ´(Russel, 1938, p. 
35). In this view, power is defined based on its¶ relative capacity to bring about desired 
effects. However, such a view may fail to capture instances in which an individual has power 
but chooses not to exert it.  
Shifting the focus to sources of power (potential or actual), French and Raven (1959) 
identify six bases of power. Legitimacy refers to the belief that an actor has the right to 
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exercise power. Expertise is the belief that an actor possesses special knowledge or 
competence. Reference refers WRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHQVHWKDWKHRUVKHLGHQWLILHVRUGHVLUHVWR
identify, with a superordinate. Lastly, rewards and coercion are the most prototypical 
operationalisations of power, and are based on the belief that an actor has the ability to 
control rewards and punishments, respectively. These bases, in turn, provide individuals with 
the potential to withhold or administer valued resources; which can be physical (e.g., pain, 
pleasure), material (e.g., money, food) or social (e.g., affection, verbal abuse; see Fiske, 
2010). In keeping with this, many researchers have defined social power as asymmetric 
control over valued resources or outcomes (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fiske & Dépret, 
1996; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Kipnis (1976) defines power as access 
to resources needed by others, and Fiske and Dépret (1996) define power as asymmetrical 
FRQWURORYHUDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VRXWFRPHV 
Although the aforementioned definitions outline the structural bases of power, 
psychological research has largely concerned itself with explaining the mental processes 
associated with power. Here, power is a mediating psychological construct. Rucker and 
Galinsky (2017, p. 26) define power as a ³psychological state or mindset of feeling 
powerful´. In this view, psychological science plays a central role in understanding power. 
Crucial pieces of work include: delineating the Sense of Power as a psychological trait and 
examining its correlates (e.g., feelings of control, optimism; Anderson, John, & Keltner, 
2012), and probing the downstream effects of activating feelings of power and powerlessness 
(e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003). 
Importantly, the psychological sense of power cannot be equated with objective 
differences in control over resources. The latter is often assumed to give rise to the former 
(Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), and proxies of 
resource-control (e.g., socio-economic status, job-role, income) predict feelings of power 
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(Anderson et al., 2012; P. K. Smith & Hofmann, 2016). Moreover, a common way of 
instilling a sense of power is to manipulate the allocation of resources (e.g., Guinote, 2007c). 
However, perceived and actual power diverge in every-day life more often than assumed (P. 
K. Smith & Hofmann, 2016), and can interact to produce unique patterns of behaviour (P. K. 
Smith & Magee, 2015), suggesting consideration must be given to both structural and 
psychological forms of power. 
Before continuing, it is important to distinguish power from other related constructs, 
such as status, leadership and social dominance orientation. Status is the evaluation of an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VDWWULEXWHV, producing differences in respect. Respect generally dictates the 
allocation of resources within groups, and is therefore related to power (French & Raven, 
1959; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, it is possible to have power without status (e.g., 
tax collectors), and status without power (e.g., µXQGHUGRJV¶), and the two constructs often lead 
to dissociable outcomes (see P. K. Smith & Magee, 2015). Leadership primarily describes the 
processes by which a group member promotes engagement towards a collective goal 
(Chemers, 2001). Although status and power can influence leaders¶ success they are not 
required, and are independent of leadership (Bass & Stogdill, 1990). Social Dominance 
Orientation is an ideological belief system (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VWHQGHQF\WRSUHIHUand endorse hierarchical social structures. 
Although such an orientation predisposes people to attain positions of power (Pratto, 
Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997), it is independent of power. Indeed, power-holders can 
exhibit behaviours oriented towards increasing equality (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001). 
The next section will discuss the empirical study of power; how individuals come to 
hold positions of high and low power, and how this impacts on behaviour and cognition. 
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1.4. Empirical Review 
The review of the empirical work begins with a discussion of how power is acquired, 
afforded and communicated. Later sections explore the effects of power on cognition and 
behaviour. That is, how do power-holders think and act, and how does this differ from those 
who are powerless?  
Acquisition and Identification 
People like the feeling of power and are motivated to attain it. Groos (1901, p. 82) 
described this as a feeling of ³MR\LQEHLQJDFDXVH´6ubsequent research has established the 
psychological importance of feelings of control (Deci & Ryan, 2002). However, group 
dynamics dictate that only a subset of members are afforded control and power. What 
governs who attains power and who does not? Those who are afforded power differ on 
multiple dimensions compared to those who do not. They possess different physiological 
characteristics (Sapolsky, 2005), negotiate social interactions differently (e.g., Anderson, 
John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001), and are typically members of different groups (e.g., Schmid 
Mast, 2004). The coming section will explore the role of these factors in how power is 
acquired and identified.  
Different neuroendocrine profiles predict attainment of power. Testosterone levels 
predict striving-for and attaining power. Testosterone increases in anticipation of 
competition, spikes in response to victory and drops as a result of defeat (Booth, Shelley, 
Mazur, Tharp, & Kittok, 1989). Testosterone also increases dominant behaviours; for 
example expressions of anger and willingness to confront a sexual competitor (Anderson & 
Kilduff, 2009; Archer, 2006; Dabbs, de La Rue, & Williams, 1990). Similar physiological 
markers predict the likelihood for people to persist in the face of obstacles (Andrew & 
Rogers, 1972), suggesting that chronically low levels of testosterone may make it difficult to 
attain positions of power.  
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Cortisol, on the other hand, is an indicator of perceived threat and anxiety. Although 
spikes in cortisol promote short-term adaptive responses to threats, chronically elevated 
cortisol is maladaptive (Sapolsky, 2005). For example, those who have chronically high 
levels of cortisol score lower on indices of self-esteem and are more likely to respond to 
social situations in a maladaptive way (i.e., overly sensitive to threat; Dickerson, 
Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004). As attaining 
power in most hierarchical structures requires effectively responding to threats (Sapolsky, 
2005), it is likely that high levels of cortisol undermine these attempts. Research looking at 
the interactive effects of testosterone and cortisol supports this. High levels of testosterone 
only predict effective attainment of power when accompanied with low levels of cortisol 
(Mehta & Josephs, 2010). Thus, particular neuroendocrine profiles (i.e., high testosterone and 
low cortisol) promote patterns of thought and behaviour that facilitate the attainment of 
power. 
The propensity to engage socially predicts attainment of power. Observing group 
dynamics suggests that extraverted and open personality styles are associated with power. In 
one study, Savin-Williams (1977) observed that more socially-dynamic and outgoing 
children were most likely to adopt leadership positions at a summer camp. Keltner and 
colleagues (1998) found a similar pattern of results when looking at peer-ratings of power 
and social openness in fraternity members. Members rated as more dynamic, open and 
playful in their teasing were rated as having greater power. Analogous traits are represented 
in the Big Five framework as extroversion (e.g., energetic, happy, outgoing), and arguably 
the inverse, neuroticism (e.g., inhibited, anxious, agitated; John & Srivastava, 1999). As 
would be expected, extraversion positively predicts, and neuroticism negatively predicts peer-
ratings of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, Galinsky, & Kraus, 2010). Similar relationships are 
found in formal settings and non-student samples (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002) 
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In practice, power covaries with assertive social behaviour. Dominance is associated 
with open and expanded postures (Tiedens & Fragale, 2002), maintaining eye-contact 
(Dovidio & Ellyson, 1985) and having a lower-pitched voice (Carney, Hall, & LeBeau, 
2005). Moreover, assertive and sophisticated verbal communication (Areni & Sparks, 2005; 
Bradac, Bowers, & Courtright, 1979; Crosby & Nyquist, 1975) is associated with power. In 
one study low status was associated with more hedges, hesitations, and tag questions, than 
was high status (Blankenship & Holtgraves, 2005). Power-holders are also more likely to 
influence others by giving advice, which can further elevate their feelings of power 
(Schaerer, Tost, Huang, Gino, & Larrick, 2018). Wakslak, Smith and Han (2014) showed that 
people who used abstract language were thought to possess higher power than those who 
used concrete language. Lastly, laughter likely conveys power. Oveis and colleagues (2013) 
found that high-status individuals laughed in a more disinhibited manor, whilst low-status 
individuals laughed in a more inhibited manor. Therefore, it seems likely that the acquisition 
of power co-varies with the ability to engage in social life in an active, dynamic and assertive 
fashion.  
The need for control differs from person to person, providing a potential explanation 
of power differences in terms of variations in personality. People who are highly motivated to 
attain power often make themselves visible to others and take more risks (McClelland & 
Watson, 1973). Likewise, leaders who have a high need for power are more likely to cope 
with group-related stress (Fodor & Smith, 1982), and take steps to keep their subordinates at 
bay (Fodor & Riordan, 1995). Moreover, implicit measures of power-motivation (n Power) 
predict testosterone and dominant behaviours (Rivers & Josephs, 2010; Schultheiss, 2013), 
suggesting that motivational differences in the desire for power play an important role in 




expectations regarding the use and acquisition of power (Hu, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2016; 
Rucker, Hu, & Galinsky, 2014). Expectation States Theory (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 
1972) and Social Role Theory (Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000) argue that certain 
characteristics are associated with the attainment of power (Berger et al., 1972). For example, 
people implicitly associate women with egalitarian structures, and men with hierarchical 
structures (Schmid Mast, 2004). Similar expectations may, in turn, account for the fact that 
particular demographic groups are more likely to attain positions of power (e.g., men vis-à-
vis women). For example, women are generally underrepresented in leadership positions 
(Stacey & Connell, 1988), and this difference is even more prominent for top power positions 
(e.g., CEO level; Adams, Gupta, Haughton, & Leeth, 2007). Thus, beliefs and expectations 
about power, and those who typically possess it, may shape the processes by which people 
come to attain of power. 
In keeping with the above, people pick-up on cues that communicate power; for 
example, superficial characteristics such as height, age and physical attractiveness (for review 
see Keltner et al., 2010). Judgements of power are also surprisingly accurate (Anderson et al., 
2001; Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995). Anderson and colleagues (2001) asked 
students living in the same dormitory to rate their peers on power after knowing them for two 
weeks and then after four and nine months. Ratings made in the first two weeks were highly 
predictive of subsequent ratings (r = .60), especially for men (r = .80). People can even judge 
power-related traits from relatively impoverished stimuli (for review see Ambady & 
Rosenthal, 1992). Judgements of status made from 60 second video clips of behaviour predict 
(r = .30) objective measures of status (e.g., income, education) suggesting people can quickly 
and reliably pickup on cues that communicate power (Kraus & Keltner, 2009). This is 
corroborated by neuroimaging data suggesting that people can differentiate between non-
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verbal cues signalling power (i.e., averted gaze vs. directed gaze) in as little as 33 
milliseconds (Insel & Fernald, 2004). All in all, the findings speak to the perceptual salience 
and importance of power in everyday life. 
In sum, people differ on multiple dimensions that predict the likelihood of attaining 
power. Important factors include: physiological correlates of aggression and anxiety, the 
propensity to engage socially, and membership in groups that are assumed to possess power. 
People largely agree on the social cues which afford power, and are quick and reliable at 
detecting them, suggesting that power is salient feature of every-day life. The next section 
explores how those in power think and behave differently to those in without power.  
Social Perception and Morality 
Power-holders are less dependent on others, and because of this are often thought to 
be less interested in them. Accordingly, those in power engage in less effortful forms of 
social perception, relying on preconceived social categories and forming more stereotypical 
impressions than those who do not possess power (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; 
Richeson & Ambady, 2003; Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005). Power also makes it 
less likely for people to take DQRWKHU¶V perspective. In one study, participants primed with 
KLJKYVORZSRZHUZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WRGUDZWKHOHWWHU³(´RQWKHLUIRUHKHDGIURPWKHLU
perspective, as opposed to the REVHUYHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH ³(´YV³ژ´*DOLQVN\0DJHH(QD
Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). In a similar vein, power-holders are less proficient at identifying 
emotions from facial expressions and speech (Galinsky et al., 2006; Uskul, Paulmann, & 
Weick, 2016; but see Schmid Mast et al., 2009). This tendency can also be seen when 
recording cortical motor responses associated with viewing other people¶V actions (i.e., 
mirror-neuron activation; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). High power participants show less 
motor resonance when viewing others¶ actions than low power participants (Hogeveen, 
Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2014). Similar effects are evident in social negotiations. Those in power ask 
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less diagnostic information about their counterparts, than do those who lack power (de Dreu 
& Van Kleef, 2004). Taken together, the results suggest that power often results in a heuristic 
and self-centred style of social perception. 
It is easy to imagine how control over resources (i.e., being powerful) coupled with a 
heuristic and self-centred orientation might lead to less than desirable moral outcomes (e.g., 
Kipnis, 1972). Recent observations suggest that power-holders perceive those around them in 
morally undesirable ways. For example, power-holders are more prone to objectify 
(Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008) and dehumanise (Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013; 
Lammers & Stapel, 2011) others, and engage in unethical behaviour, such as infidelity 
(Lammers & Maner, 2016; Trautmann, van de Kuilen, & Zeckhauser, 2013) and cheating 
(Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney, 2013). Other research has investigated how 
power affects responses to suffering and distress. In one study, participants were asked to 
share an emotional story with a partner. Participants with a high sense of power were less 
fazed by their partners distress, when hearing their story, compared to participants with a low 
sense of power (Van Kleef et al., 2008). Power-holders are also more likely to judge RWKHUV¶ 
harshly, which can lead to moral hypocrisy (Lammers & Stapel, 2009). That is, power-
holders will judge others severely for performing transgressions that they themselves are 
guilty of (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010). Thus, power can have particularly pernicious 
effects on interpersonal behaviour. 
However, power does not always promote questionable behaviour. As power reduces 
constraints it allows for a PRUHJHQXLQHH[SUHVVLRQRIRQH¶VGHVLUHVDQGYDOXHVpotentially 
leading to pro-social outcomes. When motivated, power-holders stereotype less (Overbeck & 
Park, 2001), and are more likely to correctly identify emotions in other people (Côté et al., 
2011). Power can also lead to altruistic behaviour in people with a strong moral identity (i.e., 
people who hold their moral values as central to their identity; DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & 
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Ceranic, 2012) and in people who are primed to act pro-socially (DeMarree, Briñol, & Petty, 
2014). Similarly, power does not increases sexual harassment in those who are not 
predisposed to such behaviour (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995). Power also leads to 
more charitable giving in people who have a more collectivist orientation (versus 
individualistic; Chen et al., 2001), suggesting that the pernicious effects of power are 
overcome when power-holders are motivated to be prosocial. 
In sum, power can lead to a lazy and self-centred style of social perception, increasing 
RQH¶V reliance on pre-existing social knowledge structures, and leading to undesirable social 
outcomes. Similarly, power often increases immoral behaviour; however, contextual and 
individual differences play an important role in moderating these effects. 
Motivation and Action 
Power-holders inhabit different environments to their powerless peers. The powerful 
influence others and are in charge, whilst the powerless submit to others and take orders. As a 
result, those in power are likely to encounter rewards and experience greater freedom from 
constraints, whilst those without power are likely to encounter punishment and restrictions to 
freedom (Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; Keltner et al., 2003). Because of this, power 
and powerlessness are associated with differential patterns of (in)action and motivation.  
Power motivates approach and primes action. Powerful people are more likely to 
engage socially (Moreland & Levine, 1989), adopt open and expansive postures, be more 
animated (Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982, 1985) and interrupt others while speaking (Depaulo & 
Friedman, 1998). This tendency is also evident in social negotiation. Power-holders engage 
more actively in negotiations, are more likely to present initial offers and speak more 
frequently than their powerless peers (Magee, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Wagner, 2007). Power 
has similar effects on motivation and action outside of social contexts. In one study, 
participants primed with high-power were more likely to turn off an annoying fan in their test 
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lab (Galinsky et al., 2003). In the same set of studies, high-power participants were more 
likely to hit (as opposed to stand) in a game of blackjack, compared to low-power 
participants. Power also increases the speed with which people engage in various tasks (P. K. 
Smith & Bargh, 2008). In one study, priming power reduced the time it took participants to 
move their hand toward a stimulus, and increased the time it took for participants to move 
their hand away from a stimulus (Maner, Kaschak, & Jones, 2010). The general tendency for 
power-holders to approach and act is also reflected in greater neural activity in the left pre-
frontal cortex²a correlate of approach-motivation (Boksem, Smolders, & De Cremer, 2012; 
see also Wilkinson, Guinote, Weick, Molinari, & Graham, 2010). In sum, power invigorates, 
often resulting in animated and energetic behaviour. 
Power-holders are more proficient at setting and pursuing goals, ensuring their 
propensity for action is channelled effectively. Powerful people more quickly decide on a 
course of action (Guinote, 2007c), and having done so are more likely to act consistently with 
their goals. For example, when planning days in the summer and winter power-primed 
participants plan more goal-consistent activities (e.g., summer-outdoors, winter-indoors) than 
do low power people (Guinote, 2008). Power also increases persistent goal-striving. In one 
study, high-power participants persisted for longer and tried more solutions on a difficult 
geometric tracing puzzle (Guinote, 2007c). Power-holders are also more proficient at 
juggling multiple goals, whether that means pursuing each goal in serial or multi-tasking (Cai 
& Guinote, 2017; Schmid, Kleiman, & Amodio, 2015; Schmid, Schmid Mast, & Mast, 2015).  
The propensity for power-holders to successfully set, and carry out, goals is thought 
to be aided by the benefits power bestows on low-level cognitive processing. For example, 
power improves performance on demanding cognitive tasks (e.g., stroop; Smith, Jostmann, 
Galinsky, & Van Dijk, 2008). The powerful are also more likely to extract the gist of the 
situation; detecting more patterns and categorising stimuli at a higher level, compared to low 
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power individuals (P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006). Similarly, power-holders are more flexible in 
their cognitive strategies, incorporating peripheral cues when beneficial and inhibiting cues 
when they are detrimental to the task (Guinote, 2007b). All in all, power promotes 
behavioural and cognitive mechanisms fostering effective goal-pursuit. 
The aforementioned effects are likely accentuated by the tendency for the powerful to 
be more optimistic in their judgements. High-power people have elevated perceptions of 
control (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009) and often underestimate the time it 
will take to complete tasks (Weick & Guinote, 2010). Power-holders are also more confident 
in their attitudes and decisions (Briñol, Rucker, Petty, Valle, & Becerra, 2007; Fast, 
Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012; but see Durso et al., 2016), and are less likely to 
change their minds (Eaton, Visser, Krosnick, & Anand, 2009). Anderson and Galinsky 
(2006) found that power-primed people were more likely to engage in risky behaviour (e.g., 
unprotected sex) and more likely to divulge their interests in a negotiation; perhaps due to a 
tendency to underestimate the severity of losses (Inesi, 2010). Power-holders are also more 
likely to perceive their social environment through rose-tinted glasses. That is, powerful 
people often perceive ambiguous social behaviours as positive (Keltner et al., 1998), are more 
likely to think people like them (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), and are less perturbed by social 
rejection (Kuehn, Chen, & Gordon, 2015). 
Although power typically motivates action and results in more optimistic judgement, 
this is not always the case (for review see Deng, Zheng, & Guinote, 2018). For example, 
when the powerful feel ambivalent they are more likely to forgo making a decision compared 
to the powerless (Durso et al., 2016). In a similar vein, when social hierarchies are perceived 
as illegitimate and unfair (e.g., when positions are allocated via nepotism), power no longer 
leads to approach motivation. In two studies, Lammers et al. (2008) primed participants with 
a high or low power mind-set that was either legitimate or illegitimate. Only when power 
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differences were perceived as legitimate did they lead to greater approach motivation. 
Similarly, power does not lead to more risky behaviour hierarchical positions are unstable 
(Maner, Gailliot, Butz, & Peruche, 2007). Thus, power seems to only lead to approach in 
situations perceived as relatively unambiguous and nonthreatening. 
In sum, the powerful, compared to the powerless, enjoy a more optimistic disposition, 
showing greater approach motivation and goal-directed action across social and non-social 
contexts; however, as with social perception these effects are qualified by contextual and 
personality factors. 
Consistency in Thought, Feeling and Behaviour 
Power enhances control over the environment and reduces perceptions of constraints, 
promoting freedom of thought and expression (Keltner et al., 2003; Whitson et al., 2013). A 
likely outcome of this is greater consistency in thought, feeling and behaviour. Power-holders 
are more likely to act consistently with their pre-dispositions. Their moral judgements are 
more tightly linked to their values (Chen et al., 2001; DeCelles et al., 2012), and their chronic 
information processing styles (i.e., intuitive vs. deliberative) more strongly predict how they 
approach decision-making (Kossowska, Guinote, & Strojny, 2016). Similarly, chronically 
accessible interpersonal traits (e.g., rudeness, honesty) more strongly influence impression 
formation in the powerful compared to in the powerless (Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012). 
Lastly, self-reported personality (e.g., Big Five Personality Inventory) varies less across 
contexts (e.g., with parents, at work) in those who are powerful compared to those who are 
powerless (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011), suggesting that power-holders have more 
consistent self-concepts. 
People in power also behave more consistently with their momentary subjective 
experiences. In one study, participants rated how hungry they were prior to being given the 
opportunity to snack. Hunger predicted snacking in those with a high sense of power, but not 
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in those with a low sense of power (Guinote, 2010). In a similar vein, intuitive feelings are 
more predictive of decision-outcomes in the powerful compared to in the powerless. That is, 
the ease with which exemplars are brought to mind, and the experience of motor fluency, 
more strongly predict inter-personal and aesthetic judgements in the powerful, compared to in 
the powerless (Weick & Guinote, 2008; Woltin & Guinote, 2015). Power also increases the 
consistency between subjective experiences and explicit social behaviour. For example, facial 
expressions more consistently convey mood in the powerful compared to in the powerless 
(M. A. Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). 
In sum, a lack of perceived external constraints allows the powerful to express their 
true thoughts and feelings more-so than their powerless counterparts. A focus on internal 
states, accessible constructs and subjective experiences further accentuates consistency across 
thought, feeling and behaviour. 
Physical and Mental Health 
The powerful and the powerless take differential orientations towards the world. The 
powerful encounter a wealth of opportunity and rewards, whilst the powerless are troubled 
with punishments and setbacks. Consistently encountering positive outcomes is likely to be 
comforting and uplifting, whilst having to constantly be on the lookout for threats is likely to 
take a considerable toll, increasing stress and potentially leading to undesirable long-term 
health outcomes.  
Following tropes of primates in the wild indicates that social rank predicts 
cardiovascular disease, blood clots, stroke and heart attack (Sapolsky, 2005). A similar 
relationship between social rank and health outcomes exists in humans. Indices of social rank 
(e.g., income, subjective status) inversely predict cardiovascular disease (Blanchard, Sakai, 
McEwen, Weiss, & Blanchard, 1993; Tamashiro et al., 2007). Moreover, subjective 
socioeconomic status is a better predictor of health outcomes than objective socio-economic 
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status (e.g., income) or self-reported health behaviours (e.g., alcohol consumption), 
suggesting that subjective perceptions of power are important predictors of stress and 
physical health (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). Experimental evidence observes 
a similar relationship. Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers and Sassenberg (2012) found that 
inducing a high power mind-set resulted in adaptive cardiovascular signatures associated with 
challenge. Priming a low power mind-set, on the other hand, resulted in cardiovascular 
changes associated with threat. These signatures, if observed over longer periods of time, 
predict health outcomes (Sapolsky, 2005).  
The effects of power may also extend to mental health. Animal studies suggest that 
low-status animals present with behaviours associated with depression, and that 
antidepressants reduce such behaviour (Elizalde et al., 2008). Longitudinal studies on humans 
implicate low-status as a potential cause of mental disorder (e.g., anxiety, depression; Miech, 
Caspi, Moffitt, Wright, & Silva, 1999). Experimental research corroborates this view. 
Momentary feelings of powerlessness inversely predict indices of well-being (e.g., Deci & 
Ryan, 2002), and there is reason to believe that if feelings of powerlessness persist over long 
periods of time they may manifest in chronic thinking styles associated with depression 
(Sheldon Cohen, Rothbart, & Phillips, 1976; Maier & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Seligman, 
1975). Power also improves JHQHUDOHYDOXDWLRQVRIRQH¶VOLIH)RUH[DPSOHIHHOLQJVRISRZHU
positively predict self-esteem (Wojciszke & Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007) and a sense of 
authenticity (Kifer, Heller, Perunovic, & Galinsky, 2013), perhaps providing a buffer against 
potential mental health issues. 
All in all, looking at the relationship between power and health suggests that lacking 
power is associated with substantial negative outcomes; both physical and psychological. In 




1.5. Theoretical Accounts 
Numerous theoretical accounts of power have been proposed. The Power as Control 
model argues that the need for control underlies the effects of power on social perception 
(Fiske & Dépret, 1996). The Social Distance Theory of Power attributes the effects of power 
to an asymmetric experience of social dependence, wherein power is associated with greater 
feelings of social distance (Magee & Smith, 2013). The Behavioural Approach-Inhibition 
Theory of Power couches an explanation of power in terms of neurological systems 
associated with approach and inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003). The Situated Theory of Power 
suggests that power increases cognitive flexibility and focus (Guinote, 2007a), whereas the 
Disinhibition Model of Power argues that power reduces competition between behavioural 
response options (Hirsh, Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011). These theories are discussed in-depth 
below with reference to relevant predictions regarding the links between power, cognition 
and behaviour. A discussion of the relevant links between power and mood is introduced in 
Chapter 2. 
Power as Control Model of Power 
Susan Fiske and Eric Dépret (1996) present a framework for understanding the 
relationship between power and stereotyping. In this view, power affects how attention is 
allocated to social stimuli, resulting in more (or less) stereotyping. As a high sense of control 
is associated with predictability, those with power default to attentional neglect and rely on 
pre-existing social categories. On the other hand, as a low sense of control is associated with 
uncertainty, those without power attempt to seek diagnostic information and focus on salient 
social information. This tendency is further accentuated by a motivation to maintain (and 
restore) control. As stereotypes solidify and justify social stratification (e.g., Fiske, 1993), 
those with a high sense of control are motivated to stereotype, whilst those with a low sense 
of power are motivated to individuate. 
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Results have proven largely consistent with this reasoning. Inducing high power 
results a more top-down heuristic style of social perception whereas inducing low power is 
associated with more bottom-up effortful social perception (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 
2000; Guinote, Willis, & Martellotta, 2010; Vescio et al., 2005). For example, elevating 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ sense of control leads them to pay greater attention to (i.e., spend more time 
looking at) stereotypic attributes when assessing internship applications (Goodwin et al., 
2000). Other studies have found that participants with high power show greater facilitation of 
positive words following white faces compared to participants with low power (Guinote & 
Phillips, 2010), suggesting that power increases the reliance on pre-existing knowledge 
structures in person perception.  
The Power as Control Model provides a succinct account of the effects of power on 
social perception which has proved largely consistent with empirical data. However, it is 
UHODWLYHO\FRQILQHGLQVFRSHSURYLGLQJOLWWOHLQVLJKWLQWRSRZHU¶VHIIHFWVRQEHKDYLRXUThe 
next section will discuss more wide-ranging theories: the Social Distance, Approach-
Inhibition, Situated, and Disinhibition Models of Power. 
Behavioural Approach-Inhibition Theory of Power  
Keltner and colleagues (2003) built heavily on work by Jeffrey Gray (1987), 
proposing that the relative frequency with which people with high and low power encounter 
rewards and punishments differentially activates brain systems associated with approach and 
inhibition. Early psychophysiological work suggested that individual differences in affect and 
impulsivity are a function of three underlying neurological systems: the Behavioural 
Inhibition System, the Behavioural Approach System, and the Fight or Flight System (Gray, 
1987). The approach system is said to activate in the presence of rewards, and to underlie 
positive affect and striving for desired outcomes. In other words, the approach system 
promotes attention towards rewards and goal-directed behaviour. The inhibition system, on 
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the other hand, is thought to underlie trait anxiety and responses to threats, manifesting in 
goal conflict and inhibition of ongoing processes. In line with this thinking, activation of the 
approach system is associated with impulsivity and optimism, whilst activation of the 
inhibition system is associated with perceptions of threat, punishment, and omissions of 
anticipated rewards (Carver & White, 1994; Gomez, Gomez, & Cooper, 2002). As high 
power is associated with greater access to rewards, and low power with increased 
punishments, Keltner and colleagues (2003) argue that high and low power differentially 
activate the approach and inhibition systems.  
 Power¶s effects on thought and behaviour are largely consistent with activation of the 
behavioural approach system. High-power people show greater perceptions of control (Fast et 
al., 2009) confidence (Briñol et al., 2007; Fast et al., 2012), and process information in a 
more optimistic fashion (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Inesi, 2010; Keltner et al., 1998). Power 
also results in greater behavioural indices of approach. Power-holders are lively and energetic 
in social interactions (Depaulo & Friedman, 1998; Dovidio & Ellyson, 1982, 1985; Magee et 
al., 2007; Moreland & Levine, 1989), and are more likely to take action, irrespective of the 
consequence (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003; Maner et al., 2010). Power-
holders are also more proficient at setting and carrying out goals (Guinote, 2007c). All in all, 
power seems to activate the behavioural approach system, focusing people on rewards and 
prompting goal-directed action. 
Whether power supresses the behavioural inhibition system is less clear. The powerful 
are less sensitive to negative information. For example, high-power people are less likely to 
interpret teasing as negative (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner et al., 1998). The powerful 
also report lower levels of behavioural inhibition (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), and are less 
likely to inhibit action in situations which prompt behaviour; for example, turning off a 
particularly annoying fan (Galinsky et al., 2003). However, it is unclear if the aforementioned 
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data reflect a suppression of the inhibition system. That is, positive interpretation of social 
information and behavioural disinhibition could equally arise from increased activation of the 
approach system. Moreover, when social situations are threatening to the powerful (e.g., 
when hierarchies become unstable or illegitimate) inhibitory processes can occasionally be 
comparable across levels of power (for review see Deng et al., 2018). Thus, further work is 
needed to clearly distinguish the contribution of the inhibition system to the effects of power. 
In sum, the Approach-Inhibition Model provides an account of the cognitive and 
behavioural outcomes of power in terms of brain systems associated with approach and 
inhibition. Although a large amount of evidence suggests that power activates the approach 
system, it is less clear what role the inhibition system plays. 
Social Distance Theory of Power 
The Social Distance Theory of Power (Magee & Smith, 2013) proposes that the 
effects of power can be understood in terms of experienced social distance²a sense of 
detachment, prompting coldness and a neglect of common goals (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In 
this view, independence (power) is associated with feelings of social distance, whereas 
dependence (powerlessness) is associated with feelings of social closeness. The greater 
experience of social distance is argued to manifest in neglect of social relationships, reduced 
motivation to associate, and increased abstraction in mental processing (due to the typical 
demands placed in the powerful).  
Interpreting the effects of power as mediated via feelings of social distance aligns 
with many of the typical outcomes associated with power. For example, there is evidence that 
people with high power are disinterested in those around them, as is evident by a lazy and 
heuristic style of impression formation (Goodwin et al., 2000; Richeson & Ambady, 2003; 
Vescio et al., 2005) and deficiency in identifying emotions in others (Galinsky et al., 2006). 
Power-holders are also less likely to adopt complimentary interpersonal behaviour 
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(Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Van Kleef et al., 2008)²a sign of social distance. In a 
recent study, high-power participants responded to dominant cues with approach (non-
complimentary behaviour), whereas low-power participants responded with avoidance 
(complimentary behaviour; Weick, McCall, & Blascovich, 2017). The self-interested nature 
of power-holders, as reviewed in an earlier section, is also consistent with increased feelings 
of social distance (Lammers & Stapel, 2009; Lammers et al., 2010; Lammers, Stoker, Jordan, 
Pollmann, & Stapel, 2011; Trautmann et al., 2013; Yap et al., 2013). Power-holders also 
prefer to work alone (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012), and are less likely to 
adopt the goals of their relationship partners (Laurin et al., 2016). 
The model also provides an DFFRXQWRISRZHU¶VEURDGHUHIIHFWVRQFRJQLWLRQBased 
on the tenets of construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), high power is argued to 
promote greater abstraction of thought, increasing the reliance on high-level schematic 
representations, tuning cognition to central and superordinate features. Low power, on the 
other hand, is thought to be associated with low-level unstructured representation, increasing 
the focus on peripheral and subordinate features. Supporting this view, high-power 
participants are more likely to focus on central features of a task, and detect more Gestalt 
patterns in stimuli, than low-power participants (Guinote, 2007b; Huang, Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Guillory, 2011; Smith & Trope, 2006; Stel, van Dijk, Smith, van Dijk, & 
Djalal, 2012; but see Gilder & Heerey, 2018). High-power participants are also more likely to 
describe actions in terms of the abstract goals rather than the concrete behaviours compared 
to low-power participants (P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006). Supportive evidence can also be 
found from research on how power affects creativity, goal-setting and selection (Galinsky, 
Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Gervais, Guinote, Allen, & Slabu, 2013; 
but see Sligte, de Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011). 
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However, the model may have a more difficult time accounting for the fact that power 
does not always lead to behaviours associated with greater interpersonal distance (Overall, 
Hammond, McNulty, & Finkel, 2016), and sometimes can lead to more sensitive 
interpersonal behaviour (Côté et al., 2011; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Schmid Mast et al., 
2009); for example, a greater motivation to connect with people following social exclusion 
(Narayanan, Tai, & Kinias, 2013) and a greater propensity to forgive (Karremans & Smith, 
2010 but note the effects of relationship commitment). 
In sum, the Social Distance Theory of Power suggest that power instils a sense of 
psychological distance between people, resulting in disinterested and neglectful social 
relationships, and a more abstract style of thinking. The empirical data largely support the 
model, although there is some evidence to suggest that power does not always lead to 
behaviours associated with greater social distance. 
Situated Focus Theory of Power 
Research often concludes that power exerts general effects on behaviour and 
cognition; including impression formation (Fiske, 1993), action (Galinsky et al., 2003) and 
motivation (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). However, a substantial body of research suggests 
that the effects of power may be understood in terms of variability. For example, groups with 
high power are objectively more variable than those with low power (Guinote et al., 2002). 
Power sometimes leads to greater stereotyping, but other times to greater individuation 
(Overbeck & Park, 2006). Likewise, power is associated with greater risk taking and action in 
some circumstances, but reduced risk taking and action in other circumstances (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006; Lammers et al., 2008; Maner et al., 2007). Similarly, power can produce pro-
social and anti-social behaviour depending on the person and the context (Bargh et al., 1995; 
Chen et al., 2001; Côté et al., 2011; DeCelles et al., 2012).  
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In an attempt to account for the aforementioned data, Guinote (2007a) proposed the 
Situated Theory of Power (see also Guinote, 2017 for recent review). The theory argues that 
the effects of power are goal-dependent. According to this view, power increases cognitive 
focus and flexibility, allowing individuals to more efficiently process goal-relevant 
information. For example, when engaged in difficult cognitive tasks power-holders process 
peripheral information when it facilitates the task but not when it is detrimental, suggesting 
an increased attentional focus and flexibility (Guinote, 2007b; P. K. Smith et al., 2008). 
Power also increases reliance on goal-relevant internal states. For example, sensations of 
hunger when snacking (Guinote, 2010) and subjective experiences when making intuitive 
judgements (Weick & Guinote, 2008). Furthermore, in the absence of clear goals, power 
increases the reliance on chronic dispositions (Guinote et al., 2012; Kossowska et al., 2016; 
Kraus et al., 2011), suggesting power increases the reliance on whatever factor is currently 
driving cognition. 
In sum, the Situated Theory of Power predicts that high-power is associated with a 
goal-orientated cognition, attuning people to goal-relevant factors that drive cognition. This 
attunement, in turn, causes power to be associated with more definitive thought and 
behaviour. 
Disinhibition Model of Power 
+LUVK*DOLQVN\DQG=KRQJ¶V(2011) Disinhibition Model provides an alternative 
explanation of the effects of power, drawing parallels between the effects of power, 
anonymity and alcohol consumption. The model is influenced by the psychophysiological 
work of Gray, but emphasises his later work on goal-conflict (McNaughton & Gray, 2000). 
In this view, competing responses arise when multiple goals are active, resulting in activation 
of the inhibition system. It is argued that high power is associated with reduced social 
concerns, decreasing the salience of competing response options, and thereby activating the 
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approach system (for review of the links between power and approach see previous sections) 
and silencing the inhibition system. The most salient option in any given context is therefore 
more likely to be acted upon. Low power does not provide this benefit, increasing activation 
in the inhibition system, as a result of increased competition between response options. 
Hence, the Disinhibition Model argues, similarly to the Situated Theory of Power, that high 
power produces unequivocal responses to the context, whereas low power produces equivocal 
responses to the context. 
Increased activation of the approach system translates to a strengthening of focal 
goals, and a reduction in competition from non-focal goals. Crucially, activation of the 
approach system silences the inhibition system further reducing competition. This line of 
reasoning is supported by studies suggesting that the approach and inhibition systems have an 
antagonistic relationship, such that activation in one system silences activation in the other 
(Corr, 2002). This leads people with high power to express goal-directed behaviour in a more 
uninhibited manner, compared to those with low power. In one study, Guinote (2008) found 
participants with high power were more responsive to goal-relevant contextual information, 
compared participants with low power (see also Galinsky et al., 2008). Moreover, when 
contextual information is goal-irrelevant power-holders rely more heavily on their pre-
dispositions (Guinote et al., 2012; see also Bargh et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2001; Côté et al., 
2011; DeCelles et al., 2012; Kossowska et al., 2016; Kraus et al., 2011), suggesting that 
power reduces conflict between response options. 
In sum, high power may activate brain systems associated with reduced response 
conflict, allowing more definitive cognitive and behavioural responses. Low power, on the 




The present chapter introduced the concept of power. A social-relational and 
definitions as provided in terms of relative control over valued resources and outcomes, and a 
psychological definition was presented in terms of a mind-set associated with feelings of 
social influence. Prominent empirical work on power was reviewed, including: how people 
come to hold positions of power, how power affects cognition and action, and how power 
predicts mental and physical health. Finally, prominent theories of power were outlined. 




CHAPTER 2: POWER AND MOOD 
2.1. Overview 
Chapter 2 discusses power and mood. The chapter begins by giving an overview of 
the concept of mood, highlighting the importance of mood in judgement and behaviour, and 
exploring the links between mood and social life. The next section discusses the relevant 
links between power and mood, in the context of lay-theories and theoretical models of 
power: the Approach-Inhibition (2003) and Situated (2007a) Models of Power. Lastly, a 





Mood states are important. They are subjectivly impactful; we smile and laugh when 
feeling positive, and shake and cry when feeling negative. Mood states colour how we 
perceive the world around us. Positive mood highlights what is desirable and attractive, 
whilst negative mood tints the world with danger and threat (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & 
Barrett, 2008). Mood affects how we understand and evaluate ourselves (Schwarz & Clore, 
1981), and what we are likely to store in memory (Blaney, 1986). Lastly, mood states 
motivate us. We make plans and calibrate decisions in the hopes of maximising positive 
mood and minimising negative mood (T. D. Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), and there is even a 
sense that national policy objectives should align with these goals (Diener, 2000). With this 
in mind, the coming section discusses mood, and its role in cognition and social life. 
Before continuing it may be beneficial to outline some relevant concepts. In the 
coming work we refer to emotion as a brief adaptive response arising from a relatively 
elaborate cognitive appraisal, involving coordination of brain, autonomic and behavioural 
systems (Davidson, Scherer, & Goldsmith, 2003). Mood refers to a somewhat diffuse state 
categorized by its hedonic valence, falling along a spectrum from negative to positive (Frijda, 
2009; Russell, 2009). Lastly, feelings are the subjective experience of the latter two; emotion 
and mood.  
A seemingly perpetual question surrounding mood is: what is the relationship 
between mood and cognition? Previously dominant views held that mood is invasive and 
irrational, to be controlled and overcome; with some going as far as to state that moods are 
µIDWDOIODZV¶of evolution (Koestler, 1978). However, empirical data suggests that mood can 
sometimes foster quick and effective responses, with very little loss of accuracy (e.g., Isen & 
Means, 1983). Whilst at other times, mood can lead to substantial errors and sub-optimal 
decision outcomes (e.g., Forgas, 1998). That said, many theoretical models assume that mood 
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provides an adaptive on-line evaluation of WKHHQYLURQPHQWDQGRQH¶VFXUUHQWVWDWHLQIRUPLQJ
judgement and behaviour (Frijda, 1987; Gray, 1987; Lazarus, 1991b).  
The effect of mood on cognition is evident in numerous domains (e.g., memory recall, 
perceptual discrimination, associative learning, attitude formation; for reviews see Davidson 
et al., 2003; Forgas, 2008, 2017). Bechara and colleagues (1994) provide a particularly 
compelling example of when, and how, mood informs judgement, by comparing the 
performance of neurologically healthy and brain-damaged participants on a card selection 
task. Over the course of picking cards from three decks of cards, neurologically healthy 
participants began to show increased indices of mood when considering disadvantageous 
decks. However, brain-GDPDJHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GLGQRWGLIIHUHQWiate between advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks, suggesting that mood typically provides DµVRPDWLFPDUNHU¶WKDW
guides thought and behaviour (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio, 
Everitt, & Bishop, 1996). Similar effects are evident in every-day life. For example, Schwarz 
and Clore (1981) asked participants to report their life satisfaction on sunny or rainy days. 
Consistent with the view that mood informs judgement, participants were more satisfied with 
their lives on sunny days compared to rainy days. 
Mood not only infuses cognition, but also fundamentally changes how cognition 
unfolds. From an evolutionary perspective, negative mood is of higher importance than 
positive mood, signalling threats and prompting appropriate action (Frijda, 1987; Taylor, 
1991). Consistent with this idea, negative stimuli and feelings are generally more 
psychologically impactful (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). For 
example, learned associations often form following only a single electric shock or nauseating 
experience, but not following a single treat or monetary reward (Pelchat & Rozin, 1982; 
Solomon & Wynne, 1954). Furthermore, negative mood is thought to result in more effortful 
and elaborate processing, in an attempt to better deal with threats and dangers (Taylor, 1991). 
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That is, positive mood prompts assimilative top-down processing, which relies more heavily 
on pre-existing knowledge structures. Negative mood, on the other hand, leads to an 
accommodative bottom-up processing style, which is more sensitive to the details of the 
external world (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001; Forgas & George, 2001; see also Isen & 
Daubman, 1984; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen & Means, 1983). All in all, it is 
clear that mood has far reaching effects on cognitive processes. 
The effects of mood on cognition are particularly salient in social life. Sampling mood 
in the moment suggests that people¶V experiences are more potent when alone versus with 
friends, with family versus at work, and when interacting with high versus low status peers 
(Bolger & Schilling, 1991; Fridlund, 1992; Kraut & Johnston, 1979; Smoski & Bachorowski, 
2003). Mood states influence how we process social information (Forgas, 2008, 2017). In one 
study, observers were asked to rate their own and thHLUSDUWQHU¶s behaviours on a videotape. 
Observers with elevated mood reported more positive and fewer negative behaviours than 
observers with depressed mood (Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984). Similar outcomes are 
evident in impression formation. Elevated mood leads to warm and positive impressions of 
others, whilst negative mood predicts cold and negative impressions (Bower, 1991; Forgas, 
1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987), suggesting that mood states play an important role in social 
information processing. 
The effect of mood on social cognition manifests in tangible downstream behavioural 
consequences (for review see Forgas, 1995, 2017). As previously discussed, positive and 
negative mood covary with activation in two fundamental motivational systems²the 
behavioural approach and inhibition systems (Corr, 2002; Gray, 1987; McNaughton & Gray, 
2000). Here, positive mood indicates safety and reward, prompting approach; whilst negative 
mood indicates danger and punishment, prompting inhibition of movement and/or avoidance 
(Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1987; McNaughton & Gray, 2000). This is reflected in the 
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relationship between mood and self-reported desire to engage in social interactions (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Hirschfeld et al., 2000). In a similar vein, elevated mood is associated with 
closer interpersonal proximity, greater mutual eye-gaze, more laughter and more relaxed and 
open postures (for review see Isen, 1987). Other research has explored the correlates of 
particular traits (e.g., social anxiety, neuroticism), suggesting that negative mood increases 
maladaptive responses to social interaction. For example, overly sensitive reactions to 
perceived transgressions, reduced ability to cope with social rejection, and a general tendency 
to avoid others (for review see Krohne, 2003).   
There is even evidence that momentary mood states influence complex pro-social 
behaviour, such as charitable giving (Schaller & Cialdini, 1990). Other experiments have 
shown that mood impacts on real-life interpersonal strategies, such as how people formulate 
and respond to interpersonal requests, the amount of information people share, and the type 
of information people wish to encounter (Forgas, 2002; Trope, Ferguson, & Raghunathan, 
2001). Broader theoretical accounts suggest that mood-based experiences function as social 
commitment devices, promoting long-term adaptive strategies (Frank, 1988), and aiding in 
activating and selecting cognitive strategies best suited to current social challenges 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). In a similar vein, elaborated mood states can function to 
perpetuate and enforce socio-moral norms, predicting the degree to which people will reward 
and punish others (Haidt, 2001; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Taken together the work suggests 
that mood plays an important part in producing and regulating social behaviour. 
Whilst the current review is relatively constrained in scope (see for example Davidson 
et al., 2003 for reviews of the relationship between mood, genetics, neuroscience, learning, 
personality, health and mental disorders), it is evident that mood has far reaching effects on 
thought and behaviour. Evidence was reviewed suggesting that mood plays a particularly 
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important role in social life. With this in mind, the next section explores the links between 
mood and one of the most ubiquitous forces in social life²power (Russel, 1938). 
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2.3. Power and Mood 
Given the pervasive links between social life and mood, and the ubiquity of power 
(Guinote & Vescio, 2010; P. K. Smith & Hofmann, 2016), it is perhaps not surprising that 
people hold beliefs about the relationship between power and mood. Lay theories suggest that 
high power is associated with elevated mood and low power with depressed mood 
(Mondillon et al., 2005). Intuitions may derive from the fact that power dictates the allocation 
of valued resources (Fiske & Dépret, 1996), assuring that the powerful get what they want, 
more-so than their powerless peers. More cynical views suggest that power is an end in itself. 
George Orwell explored the effects of power in Animal Farm and 1984, describing power as 
euphoric and intoxicating, suggesting that feelings of social influence elevate mood (Orwell, 
1945, 1949). This aligns with archetypes of tyrannical bosses and megalomaniacal dictators, 
and with the fact that people seem to enjoy the psychological sense of control (Deci & Ryan, 
2002). Irrespective of whether power is a means or an end, beliefs converge in stating that 
power elevates mood and powerlessness depresses mood. Formalising these beliefs, the 
Approach-Inhibition Model of Power argues that high power activates brain systems 
associated with positive mood and low power activates brain systems associated with 
negative mood (Keltner et al., 2003). 
Supporting this view, measures of social and economic status, dominance, 
assertiveness, social potency, and assumed leadership roles positively correlate with mood 
(Anderson et al., 2001; Clark, 1990; Collins, 1990; Kemper, 1991; Watson & Clark, 1997). 
This is corroborated by data from developmental cohorts±peer-ratings of status, which 
positively predict mood (D. B. Hecht, Inderbitzen, & Bukowski, 1998; Kupersmidt & 
Patterson, 1991). Subsequent research measuring perceptions of power in everyday life 
reports similar findings (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic, 2014; 
Weick & Guinote, 2008, 2010). Smith and Hofmann (2016) recently WUDFNHGSHRSOH¶VPRRG
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over a three-day period, finding that high power positions were associated with elevated 
mood and low power positions with depressed mood. 
Some experimental research is consistent with the view that high power produces 
elevated mood and low power depressed mood. Manipulations of high power have been 
observed to elevate mood and increase smiling compared to low power (Berdahl & 
Martorana, 2006; Côté & Moskowitz, 2002; Keltner et al., 2003; LaFrance & Hecht, 1999; 
Langner & Keltner, 2008; Wojciszke & Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007 see also Bombari, 
Mast, & Bachmann, 2017). This research has shaped the seemingly prevailing view that high 
power elevates mood and low power depresses mood (apearing in major handbooks; Fiske, 
Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010). 
 However, when all the available experimental data on power and mood is examined 
(data is easily overlooked as mood is often included as a non-focal variable), the relationship 
between power and mood becomes far less clear. Whilst numerous studies report that power 
elevates mood (see above), an equally substantial body of research finds no significant effect 
of power on mood (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fast et al., 2012; Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Guinote et al., 2012; Overbeck & Droutman, 2013; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; P. K. Smith & 
Bargh, 2008; P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006; Weick & Guinote, 2008, 2010). These results 
suggest that the relationship between power and mood may not be as clear as originally 
thought.  
There is reason to believe that the relationship between power and mood may be 
dependent on the context. Such intuitions can be seen in popular articles on how to manage a 
µPRRG\¶or unpredictable boss (e.g., J. Smith, 2013; Usheroff, 2014). Media portrayals also 
readily capture this side of power. For example, Tony Montana from Scarface and Walter 
White from Breaking Bad (De Palma, 1983; Gilligan, 2008). Here we follow the titular 
characters in their attempts to become drug king-pins. As their power increases the characters 
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become increasingly prone to outbursts of joy in response to positive outcomes, but also to 
surges of unhappiness when circumstances take a turn for the worse.  
This aspect of power is formalised in the Situated Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a).  
In this view, the effects of power are understood in terms of broader views of cognition, in 
which mental processes flexibly adapt to the demands of the present context (e.g., Barsalou, 
1999). Here, a context can be thought of as an environmental opportunity for cognition, 
action or affectDNLQWRDQµDIIRUGDQFH¶(see Gibson, 1986). For example, handles afford 
grasping (Tucker & Ellis, 1998), steps afford climbing (Warren, Kay, Zosh, Duchon, & 
Sahuc, 2001), a snake affords fear and a romantic partner affords happiness (Lazarus, 1991a, 
1991b). The same logic also applies to subtle and more every-day contexts. For example, 
sunny and warm weather affords positive mood, whilst windy and cold weather affords 
negative mood (Denissen, Butalid, Penke, & van Aken, 2008),QWKLVVHQVHDµFRQWH[W¶FDQ
be defined according to whether or not it affords positive or negative mood. 
The Situated Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a) argues that power attunes people to 
the important features in their surroundings, resulting in greater variability. In terms of mood, 
this translates to greater ups and downs and a more variable mood. That is, high power should 
elevate mood in positive contexts but also depress mood in negative contexts, compared to 
low power. In this sense, power is associated with moodiness and volatility. Similar 
predictions can be derived from the Disinhibition Model of Power (Hirsh et al., 2011). 
Tests of variability in mood associated with power are difficult to come by. Current 
data is almost exclusively comprised of single measures of mood, often as control variables 
(Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Côté & Moskowitz, 2002; Fast et 
al., 2012; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote et al., 2012; LaFrance & Hecht, 1999; Langner & 
Keltner, 2008; Overbeck & Droutman, 2013; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; P. K. Smith & 
Bargh, 2008; P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006; Strelan et al., 2014; Weick & Guinote, 2008, 2010; 
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Wojciszke & Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007). However, in order to test variability, multiple 
measures of mood are required across contexts of differing valence (negative vs. positive).  
One notable exception is a study by Guinote (2008), who assigned participants to high 
or low power roles and then asked participants to plan two days; one in a positive context 
(summer) and one in a negative context (winter). Raters then estimated participants¶ mood 
throughout these days. Participants assigned a high power role were judged to show a greater 
difference in their mood between summer and winter, compared to those in a low power role. 
Although these results are encouraging, they are derived from a single small sample (n = 44), 
and may be accounted for in other ways. In particular, it was found that high power 
participants made more active outdoor plans in the summer and less in the winter compared 
to low power participants, meaning that any differences in mood could be explained by 
objective differences in planning. 7RWKHDXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJHWKHUHFXUUHQWO\GRHVQRWH[LVWD
more convincing test of variability in mood associated with power. 
The current literature is also limited in its ability to distinguish between the 
independent contributions of high and low power. Although empirical work often describes 
asymmetric effects of high and low power (e.g., P. K. Smith et al., 2008; Wilkinson et al., 
2010), researchers regularly assume the effects of high and low power are symmetrical (see 
also Moskowitz, 2004). A recent review of 293 studies on power found that only 17% of 
studies included a control condition, with researchers largely framing differences between 
high and low power in terms of power, as opposed to powerlessness (du Plessis, Schaerer, 
Yap, & Thau, 2016). Research including measures of power and mood falls prey to similar 
limitations, potentially concealing differential effects of high and low power (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Guinote et al., 2012; Overbeck & Droutman, 
2013; Weick & Guinote, 2008). This issue is further exacerbated by the fact that there is 
reason to suspect that the relationship between power and mood may not be linear. Several 
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studies have found that feelings of high (vs. medium) power do not affect mood, whilst 
feelings of low (vs. medium) power depress mood (Côté & Moskowitz, 2002; M. A. Hecht & 
LaFrance, 1998; Wojciszke & Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007). Thus, research ought to include 
comparisons between high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power to tease apart the 
effects of power and powerlessness. 
In sum, a recent review of the literature suggests the relationship between power and 
mood is more complex than initially thought. Lay belief and academic theory suggest that the 
relationship between power and mood may depend on the valence of the context. That is, 
power may be associated with greater variability across contexts of opposing valence 
(negative vs. positive). Although these assumptions are supported by some initial data, 
conclusions remain tentative. Moreover, there is reason to believe that current approaches 
(assuming the effects of high and low power are linear and neglecting to include 
baseline/control levels of power) may have provided a one-sided picture of the effects of 
power. All in all, the present review suggests that more robust tests of the relationship 





The present chapter introduced the concept of mood. This was followed by a 
discussion of relevant empirical and theoretical links between power and mood. Lay intuition 
and academic theory suggest that power should elevate mood (Keltner et al., 2003) and 
increase variability in mood (Guinote, 2007a) across contexts (negative vs. positive). 
However, the available empirical evidence is inconsistent and limited. With these limitations 
in mind, the present research investigated the effects of power on mood in and across 
different contexts and tested the predictions of the Approach-Inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003) 
and Situated (Guinote, 2007a) Models of Power. The next chapter documents the empirical 




CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL WORK 
3.1. Overview 
Chapter 3 presents the empirical work, describing five studies testing the effects of 
power on mood across different contexts. The programme of research builds on previous 
work and tests predictions of the Approach-Inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003) and Situated 
(Guinote, 2007a) models of power. We expect high power to elevate and low power to 
depress mood at baseline (Keltner et al., 2003), and high power to increase and low power to 
decreases variability in mood across contexts of opposing valence (negative vs. positive; 
Guinote, 2007). 
Following recent recommendations (e.g., Cumming, 2014), our findings are replicated 
across different samples and operationalisations. Power was operationalised via personality 
(Studies 1-2), priming (Study 3) and role assignment (Study 4). Stimuli of different valence 
(negative vs. neutral vs. positive) were randomly sampled using numerous 
operationalisations: imagined scenarios (Studies 1a and 1b), experience sampling (Study 2), 
music (Study 3) and image induction (Study 4). For full breakdown of all operationalisations 
of power, context and stimuli, by sample, see Table 1. 
All available data was collated via meta-DQDO\VLVDYRLGLQJSRWHQWLDOµILOH-GUDZHU¶
issues and aiding interpretation of seemingly inconsistent results (e.g., Cumming, 2014). 
Results from self-reported mood are summarised at intermittent stages (Studies 1a and 1b, 
Study 2, Studies 3 and 4), and finally across all samples (Studies 1-4). Lastly, to more fully 
capture the experience of mood (Cacioppo, Tassinary, & Berntson, 2007) we measured facial 





Studies 1-4: Overview of the operationalisations of power, context, number of sampled stimuli and measures of mood. Tables A25-A30 in the Appendix 
provide a full lists of stimuli and further details on pre-tests. 
 Operationalisation   
Sample Power Context # of Stimuli Measure of Mood 
Study 1a Personality Imagined Context 3 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), 
20-item measure (e.g., afraid, enthusiastic) rated from 1 (very slightly or not 
at all) to 5 (extremely). 
Study 1b Personality Imagined Context 17 Semantic Differential (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977), 6-item measure rated from -3 (e.g., unhappy) to +3 (e.g., happy). 
Study 2 Personality Circadian rhythm 21 Semantic Differential (Yik, Russell, & Steiger, 2011), 3-item measure rated from -3 (e.g., unhappy) to +3 (e.g., happy). 
Study 3 Prime Music 25 Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994), single-item pictorial 
measure rated from 1 (negative) to 9 (positive). 
Study 4 Role Images 48 
Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994), single-item pictorial 
measure rated from 1 (negative) to 9 (positive). Facial electromyography 





3.2. Studies 1a and 1b: Mood in Imagined Contexts 
Studies 1a and 1b build on the most consistent finding in the literature²a positive 
relationship between self-reported feelings of power and mood at baseline (e.g., Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; P. K. Smith & Hofmann, 2016). The research seeks to replicate the 
relationship between power and mood at baseline, and extend this work by exploring the 
relationship between power and mood in positive and negative contexts. An initial test of the 
variability hypothesis is provided by comparing mood across positive and negative contexts 
as a function of power. Participants in Study 1a imagined two days, in the weekend in 
summer and in the week in exam period. As weekends and summer are typically associated 
with relaxation and leisure activities, and weekdays and exams with routine activities and 
obligations, the former represents a positive context and the latter a negative context 
(Guinote, 2008). Study 1b controlled for potential confounds in 6WXG\D¶V imagination task. 
That is, as power affects planning and recall of events, differences in mood between levels of 
power could be due to objective differences in the number and types of activities brought to 
mind (Weick & Guinote, 2008, 2010). Study 1b controls for this by asking participants to 
imagine a range of specific events; both SRVLWLYHHJ³you receive a prestigious award´
and negative HJ³you are the victim of a theft´Due to the similarity in measures of power 
and operationalisations of context, the methodology and results of Study 1a and 1b are 
presented together. 
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Study 1a. Two-hundred and thirteen students from the School of Psychology, University 
of Kent participated in exchange for course credit. Seventeen participants were excluded as 
they failed pre-SODQQHGDWWHQWLRQFKHFNVHJ³If you are reading this please select 4´





Study 1b. Two-hundred and eighty-nine paid workers from the U.S. participated through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.80. Fourteen participants were excluded as they 
failed pre-planned attention checks, leaving a final sample of 275 (109 female; Mage = 23.96, 
SD = 11.06) participants. 
Design. Study 1a and Study 1b followed mixed designs. Power was measured between 
participants (low vs. medium vs. high) and contexts were manipulated within participants 
(negative vs. baseline vs. positive). 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants in both studies completed the task online, which was described as a study on 
planning events and relationships. Participants indicated how much control they felt in their 
everyday life HJ³,IHHOSRZHUIXOLQP\HYHU\GD\OLIH´$QGHUVRQHWDO, and then 
WKHLUPRRGDWEDVHOLQH³How do you generally IHHO"´) and in different positive and negative 
LPDJLQHGFRQWH[WV³+RZGR\RXIHHOLQ>LPDJLQHGFRQWH[W@"´). In Study 1a participants 
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)²a 20-
item measure (e.g., afraid, enthusiastic) of mood rated from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 
(extremely). In Study 1b participants completed an Affect Semantic Differential Scale²a 6-
item bipolar self-report measure of mood (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Russell & Mehrabian, 
1977), anchored at -3 (e.g., unhappy) and +3 (e.g., happy). In Study 1a, participants planned 
two future days, during summer in the weekend (positive) and during exam period in the 
week (negative; see Guinote, 2008). In Study 1b, participants imagined themselves in two 
positive (e.g., ³\RXUHFHLYHDSUHVWLJLRXVDZDUG´) and two negative situations (e.g., ³\RXDUH
WKHYLFWLPRIDWKHIW´), randomly sampled from a pool of sixteen contexts (ipos = 8, ineg = 8). 
The sixteen contexts were selected based on a pre-test using a larger pool of items, whereby 
150 participants (69 female; Mage = 34.92, SD = 12.41) recruited through Amazon Mechanical 





undesirable; completely controllable; lose a lot) to 7 (very desirable; completely 
controllable; gain a lot; see Tables A25 and A28 in Appendix). The contexts in both studies 




All data were collected prior to analysis. Multi-item measures were averaged to derive 
composites prior to analyses (as > .74). In Study 1a, SDUWLFLSDQWV¶3$1$6VFRUHVRQWKH
negative dimension were subtracted from their scores on the positive dimension to provide an 
index of overall mood (a typical approach to assessing well-being and mood; Diener, 2009; 
for representative examples see Bradburn, 1969; Diener et al., 2010). Higher scores represent 
greater positive mood. For Study 1b, mood scores for baseline, and each context were 
aggregated. To aid subsequent cross-study comparisons using discrete levels of power (see 
Studies 3 and 4), and to pry apart the effects of high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) 
power, Sense of Power scores were converted into tertiles (Low vs. Medium vs. High; see 
DeCoster, Iselin & Gallucci, 2009). 
Operationalisation Check 
Participants reported being in a more positive mood after imagining a positive 
context, and less a positive mood after imagining a negative context, compared with the 










Studies 1a and 1b: Mood in different contexts. 
 Context  
Sample Negative Baseline Positive Valence main effect 
Study 1a 0.38a(1.16) 0.94b(1.06) 1.81c(1.02) F(2, 390) = 143.50, p < .001, Șp2 = .43 
Study 1b 2.21a(0.71) 5.01b(1.28) 5.85c(1.01) F(2, 548) = 1081.78, p < .001, Șp2 = .80 
NB: Observed means and standard deviations in parentheses. Higher values indicate more 
positive mood. Scores are derived from the PANAS in Study 1a (Watson et al., 1988) and the 
Affect Semantic Differential Scale in Study 1b (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Russell & 
Mehrabian, 1977). Means not sharing a common subscript within rows are significantly 
different (p < .05). 
Main analysis  
To maximize statistical power and identify trends that generalise across studies we 
analyse overall variations in mood across Studies 1a and 1b at the meta-level (Cumming, 
2012, 2014). As contexts (negative vs. baseline vs. positive) are nested within participants 
and may be modelled as a random effect, our data lend themselves to multi-level modelling 
(see Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012; Quené & Van den Bergh, 2004). A random slope and 
intercept model with homogeneous variances was fitted to the mood data (descriptive 
statistics are provided in Appendices, Tables A4 and A5). Intercepts were allowed to vary 
between participants and between stimuli. Slopes were allowed to vary within participants 
and between contexts (negative vs. baseline vs. positive). Fixed effect dummy coefficients 
compared high (D1=1, D2=0) and low (D2=0, D2=1) power with medium power, and positive 
(D3=1, D4=0) and negative (D3=0, D4=1) contexts with baseline. A fixed effect contrast 
coefficient (Study 1a=1, Study 1b=-1) was used to model between-study variance. All fixed 
effects interactions were included. Adding the fixed effects improved the model fiW¨-2LL = 
194.05, df = 17, p < .001. Variance estimates are provided below (Table 3.). Crucial 





Mood in Different Contexts. We initially examined the coefficients estimating 
differences between high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power (D1, D2) at baseline 
(D3=0, D4=0). The results showed that, high power was associated with elevated mood, 
coeffD1 = 0.44, SE = 0.10, p < .001, 95% CI [0.25, 0.64], r = .14, whilst low power was 
associated with depressed mood, coeffD2 = -0.82, SE = 0.10, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.01, -0.62], 
r = -.24. 
To examine the effects of high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power in positive 
and negative contexts the model was re-run after recoding the dummy coefficients 
representing context (D3, D4). A model in which 0 represented positive contexts (baseline: D3 
= 1, positive: D3 = 0) provided estimates of power in positive contexts, and a model in which 
0 represented negative contexts provided estimates of power in negative contexts (baseline: 
D4 = 1, negative: D4 = 0; see Tables A12 and A13 for full variance estimates). A similar 
pattern of results was found in positive contexts. High power was associated with elevated 
mood, coeffD1 = 0.30, SE = 0.08, p < .001, 95% CI [0.14, 0.45], r = .14, and low power with 
depressed mood, coeffD2 = -0.25, SE = 0.08, p = .002, 95% CI [-0.42, -0.09], r = -.11. 
However, neither high nor low power predicted mood in negative contexts, coeffD1 = 0.03, 
SE = 0.10, p = .851, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.22], r = .01, coeffD2 = -0.02, SE = 0.010, p = .641, 95% 
CI [-0.25, 0.88], r = -.02.  
To determine if the effects of power differed across contexts, we examined 
interactions between power (D1, D2) and context (D3, D4) dummy variables in the initial 
model. In this model, the positive context x power (D1xD3, D2xD3) and negative context x 
power (D1xD4, D2xD4) coefficients reflect differences in the effects of high (vs. medium) and 
low (vs. medium) power in positive and negative contexts (vs. at baseline). The association 
between high power and elevated mood was similar in positive contexts as at baseline (or at 





whilst the association between low power and depressed mood was noticeably weaker in 
positive contexts compared to at baseline, coeffD2xD3 = 0.59, SE = 0.12, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.36, 0.82], r = 0.17, although low power still depressed mood in positive contexts (see prior 
analyses). The association between high and low power and mood were both weaker in 
negative contexts compared to at baseline, coeffD1xD4 = -0.41, SE = 0.12, p = .001, 95% CI [-
0.65, -0.17], r = -.11, coeffD2xD4 = 0.81, SE = 0.13, p < .001, 95% CI [0.56, 1.05], r = .21, as 
was suggested by the null-relationship between high and low power and mood in negative 
contexts (see prior analyses). 
Variability in Mood between Contexts. To examine how mucKLQGLYLGXDOV¶PRRG
varied between contexts of opposing valence (negative vs. positive), responses at baseline 
were excluded. As a result, the context dummy variable (positive: D3 = 1, negative: D3 = 0) 
now represented differences between contexts of opposing valence (negative vs. positive). 
Crucially, interactions involving dummy variables representing power and context now 
provide estimates of the effects of high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power on 
variability. That is, coefficients (D1xD3 and D2xD3) reflect greater/lesser differences in mood 
between negative and positive contexts as a function of high (vs. medium, D1xD3) and low 
(vs. medium, D2xD3) power. As shown in Table 3., high power participants varied more, 
coeffD1xD3 = 0.29, SE = 0.11, p = .005, 95% CI [0.08, 0.49], r = .10, and low power 
participants varied less, coeffD2xD3 = -0.23, SE = 0.11, p = .036, 95% CI [-0.44, -0.01], r = -
.08, in their mood across negative and positive contexts. 
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Studies 1a and 1b: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power at baseline providing the reference category. Crucial hypothesis 
tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power, and high and low power x context interactions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff.  SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 3.60*** 0.48 2.60 4.59   3.08*** 0.59 1.82 4.35 13.99 5.22 .81 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.44*** 0.10 0.25 0.64 1076.78 4.47 .14 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)      -0.82*** 0.10 -1.02 -0.62 1076.83 -8.13 -.24 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=baseline)       0.72 0.74 -0.86 2.31 13.93 0.98 .25 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=baseline)      -1.84* 0.74 -3.42 -0.26 13.99 -2.49 -.55 
 D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context      -0.15 0.11 -0.37 0.08 866.51 -1.28 -.04 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.41** 0.12 -0.65 -0.17 875.51 -3.32 -.11 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context       0.59*** 0.12 0.36 0.81 865.88 5.08 .17 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.81*** 0.13 0.56 1.05 875.14 6.42 .21 
Fixed Effects (Study)            
Study      -2.09** 0.59 -3.35 -0.82 13.86 -3.54 -.69 
Study x High Power       0.04 0.07 -0.10 0.18 443.27 0.61 .03 
Study x Low Power       0.13 0.07 -0.01 0.27 443.46 1.76 .08 
Study x Positive Context       0.01 0.73 -1.57 1.58 13.72 0.01 .00 
Study x Negative Context       1.17 0.74 -0.41 2.75 13.74 1.59 .39 
Study x High Power x Positive Context     
  0.02 0.12 -0.21 0.25 906.89 0.18 .01 
Study x High Power x Negative Context     
  0.44** 0.13 0.19 0.69 919.15 3.48 .02 
Study x Low Power x Positive Context     
 -0.42** 0.12 -0.65 -0.18 906.95 -3.48 -.01 
Study x Low Power x Negative Context     
 -0.37** 0.13 -0.63 -0.12 919.44 -2.90 .00 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.65*** 0.03 0.58 0.72   0.58*** 0.03 0.52 0.65 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
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Participant  0.25*** 0.03 0.19 0.32   0.20*** 0.03 0.15 0.26 - - - 
Stimuli 4.53*** 1.44 2.43 8.44   0.69** 0.26 0.32 1.46 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.02 0.04 0.00 1.05   0.06 0.04 0.02 0.23 - - - 
Negative Context  0.23*** 0.06 0.14 0.38   0.25*** 0.06 0.16 0.39 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number of parameters) 5463.53(6)   5269.48(23) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the high- and low-power dummy variables denote deviations from medium 
power at baseline/in neutral contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, whereas regression 
coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded virtually identical results. 
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Studies 1a and 1b: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power in negative contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: high and low power x context interactions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff.  SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 3.67*** 0.50 2.61 4.73   1.25*** 0.44 0.31 2.20 14.10 2.85 .60 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.06 0.08 -0.11 0.22 892.53 0.66 .02 
D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)      -0.06 0.09 -0.23 0.10 892.72 -0.75 -.03 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       2.56*** 0.62 1.22 3.89 14.01 4.12 .74 
D1xD3: High Power * Positive Context        0.29* 0.11 0.08 0.49 750.43 2.70 .10 
D2xD3: Low Power * Positive Context       -0.23* 0.11 -0.44 -0.01 748.53 -2.09 -.08 
Fixed Effects (Study)                 
 
Study      -0.92* 0.44 -1.87 0.02 14.00 -2.11 -.49 
Study x High Power        0.17* 0.07 0.03 0.31 440.76 2.42 .11 
Study x Low Power        0.00 0.07 -0.14 0.14 441.21 -0.02 .00 
Study x Positive Context       -1.16 0.62 -2.49 0.17 13.74 -1.88 .45 
Study x High Power x Positive Context     
 -0.42*** 0.12 -0.65 -0.19 907.82 -3.59 -.01 
Study x Low Power x Positive Context     
 -0.05 0.12 -0.28 0.19 908.06 -0.40 -.01 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.58*** 0.04 0.51 0.66   0.59*** 0.04 0.52 0.67 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.14*** 0.03 0.09 0.22   0.12** 0.03 0.08 0.20 - - - 
Stimuli 4.52*** 1.51 2.35 8.70   0.67*** 0.26 0.32 1.43 - - - 
Random Slope Variance 
        
   
Positive Context 0.19*** 0.05 0.11 0.33   0.14** 0.05 0.07 0.28 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number of parameters) 3962.41(5)   3899.55(16) 
51 
SOCIAL POWER AND MOOD          
 
 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the interaction between low- and high-power and context dummy variables 
(highlighted in bold) denote greater/lesser variability relative to medium power. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimates, whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both 





Supporting lay beliefs and theoretical models (Keltner et al., 2003), the results from 
Studies 1a and 1b suggest that high power is associated with elevated mood, and low power 
with depressed mood at baseline and in positive contexts. However, no differences between 
levels of power were found in negative contexts, suggesting that the effects of power are 
moderated by the valence of the context. Furthermore, high power was associated with 
greater variability in mood, and low power with lesser variability in mood across contexts of 
opposing valence²consistent with theoretical predictions (Guinote, 2007b). The initial 
findings are encouraging, largely supporting our predictions. Moving forward, the findings 
are consolidated across different operationalisations of power and context, and more 





3.3. Study 2: Mood in Every Day Life 
Continuing with our individual difference approach, we again sought to test the 
relationship between power and mood in and across different contexts. Study 2 used a novel 
mobile phone application to track feelings of power and mood in everyday life. This 
approach is particularly advantageous due to its ability to detect variability in mood within 
individuals across situations and time (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014). Moreover, the 
approach samples mood in response to more subtle every-day stimuli (compared to the more 
unambiguous and salient stimuli used in Studies 1a and 1b), which may allow for greater 
differences to manifest between individuals (Fiske et al., 2010). Similarly, Study 2 addresses 
potential problems associated with carry-over effects when presenting contexts of opposing 
valence in relatively swift succession. The approach also increases the generalisability of our 
findings by capturing a wide range of everyday experiences across a seven-day period.  
Taking cues from previous experience sampling research, positive and negative 
contexts were identified as a function of pDUWLFLSDQWV¶circadian rhythms. Differences in sleep-
wake cycles influence mood across the day, and are associated with preferences for mornings 
versus evenings (e.g., Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990)6DPSOLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶experiences 
throughout the day, in preferred (e.g., evenings for evening-types) and non-preferred times 
(e.g., mornings for evening-types) provided a measure of mood in positive and negative 
contexts (Kerkhof, 1998). Participants completed the Sense of Power scale (Anderson et al., 
2012) and the Reduced Morning-Evening Questionnaire²a measure of preferred time-of-day 
(Adan & Almirall, 1991), and were then prompted via a novel experience sampling 






Participants and Design 
Two-hundred and thirty-two students from the School of Psychology, University of 
Kent participated in exchange for course credits. Forty-two participants were excluded due 
to: failing pre-planned attention checks (n = 6), equipment error (n = 12), software 
adaptability issues (n = 9) or lack of responses (n = 17), leaving a final sample of 190 
participants (167 female; Mage = 20.22, SD = 2.20). 
Study 2 followed a correlational design. Power was measured between participants (low 
vs. medium vs. high) and contexts were identified within participants (negative vs. neutral vs. 
positive). 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants attended an initial lab session in which they completed a battery of 
individual difference measures, including the Sense of Power Scale HJ³I feel powerful in 
my everyday life´$QGHUVRQHWDO. Participants also completed the Reduced Morning-
(YHQLQJ4XHVWLRQQDLUHDILYHLWHPVFDOHHJ³2QHKHDUVDERXWµPRUQLQJ¶DQGµHYHQLQJ¶
types. Which one of these do you consider yourself?´UDQJLQJIURPDefinitely morning 
type) to 4 (Definitely evening typeDVVHVVLQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶SUHIHUHQFHs towards evenings or 
mornings (Adan & Almirall, 1991)7RVDPSOHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SHULHQFHV*RRJOH¶V3HUVRQDO
$QDO\WLFV&RPSDQLRQ3$&29HUVLRQ*RRJOHZDVLQVWDOOHGRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
smart phones. The application was set to signal three times a day at random intervals, 
between the times of 10:00 am and 8:00 pm1. Signals were restricted to appear no less than 
30 minutes apart. Following the lab session (day 0), participants reported on their mood for 
seven days (day 1-7). On receiving a signal, participants completed a brief questionnaire 
                                                 
1
 Notifications were set to alert no earlier than 10:00AM, as previous research has documented later rising times 




assessing their current mood on a 3-item measure, from 1 (Unhappy, Scared, Sad) to 7 
(Happy, Peaceful, Enthusiastic; Yik et al., 2011). Participants then returned to the lab, 
completed the same Sense of Power Scale and were debriefed. 
Results 
Data Preparation 
Mean scores and reliability statistics were calculated for measures of Sense of Power 
and mood (aV7KHWLPHDQG6HQVHRI3RZHUPHDVXUHVZHUHWKHQFROODSVHGr = .72) 
and converted into tertiles (Low vs. Medium vs. High) to aid later cross-study comparisons 
and to differentiate between the effects of high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power. 
Responses to the Morning-Evening Questionnaire were summed and then categorised into 
ILYHµW\SHV¶IROORZLQJ$GDQDQG$OPLUDOOQDefinitelyEvening = 24, nModeratlyEvening = 68, 
nNeither = 87, nModeratlyMorning = 11, nDefinitelyMorning = 0. Due to a lack of morning types (as is 
typical in student samples; Mecacci & Zani, 1983), the first two and last three categories 
were collapsed, classifying participants as either evening or non-evening types (nEvening = 92, 
nNon-Evening = 98). Lastly, responses were coded based on the time of day they were completed, 
from 10:00 am to 8:00 pm in bins of two hours ranging from 1 (10:00 am to 12:00 am) to 5 
(6:00 pm to 8:00 pm). Responses recorded more than 10 minutes following a notification 
were excluded prior to the analysis. 
Operationalisation Check 
Confirming the operationalisation of context, evening types experienced more 
positive mood in the evenings (6:00 pm to 8:00 pm; M = 5.01, SD = 0.64), t(188) = 1.86, p = 
.063, and more negative mood in the mornings (10:00 am to 12:00 am; M = 4.54, SD = 0.99), 
t(183) = -2.31, p = .022, compared to non-evening types (10:00 am to 8:00 pm; M = 4.82, SD 




were classified as positive contexts, and mornings as negative contexts for evening types. 
Neutral contexts were identified as any time for non-evening types. 
Main analysis 
Continuing with the multi-level analysis approach, a random intercept and slope 
model with homogeneous variances was fitted to the mood data (descriptive statistics are 
provided in Appendices, Table A6). Intercepts were allowed to vary across participants and 
time intervals. Slopes were allowed to vary within participants and between contexts 
(negative vs. neutral vs. positive). Fixed effect dummy coefficients compared high (D1=1, 
D2=0) and low (D2=0, D2=1) power with medium power, and positive (D3=1, D4=0) and 
negative (D3=0, D4=1) contexts with baseline. Adding these fixed effects improved the model 
ILW¨-2LL = 17.93, df = 8, p = .022. Variance estimates and crucial hypothesis tests are 
presented below (Table 5).  
Mood in Different Contexts. We first looked at the coefficients estimating 
differences between high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power in neutral contexts (D1, 
D2). High power did not predict mood, coeffD1 = 0.10, SE = 0.11, p = .360, 95% CI [-0.12, 
0.31], r = .06, whilst low power was associated with depressed mood, coeffD2 = -0.26, SE = 
0.11, p = .017, 95% CI [-0.48, -0.05], r = -.17.  
We again recoded the dummy variables representing contexts to provide estimates of 
high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power in positive contexts (baseline: D3 = 1, 
positive: D3 = 0) and negative contexts (baseline: D4 = 1, negative: D4 = 0; see Tables A14 
and A15 for full variance estimates). This analysis revealed that high power was associated 
with elevated mood in positive contexts, coeffD1 = 0.33, SE = 0.16, p = .041, 95% CI [0.01, 
0.65], r = .08, whilst low power was not associated with any differences in mood in positive 
contexts, coeffD2 = 0.06, SE = 0.17, p = .621, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.40], r = .01. Moving to 




medium power, coeffD1 = -0.02, SE = 0.18, p = .852, 95% CI [-0.38, 0.34], r = -.00, coeffD2 = 
0.16, SE = 0.20, p = .241, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.55], r = .02. 
As in Studies 1a and 1b, we examined the power x context interactions in the initial 
model (negative vs. neutral vs. positive; D1xD3, D2xD3, D1xD4, D2xD4) to investigate 
differences in the effects of high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power in positive and 
negative contexts (vs. in neutral contexts). The association between high power was no 
different in positive contexts compared to neutral contexts, coeffD1xD3 = 0.19, SE = 0.15, p = 
.195, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.49], r = .13, although it is worth noting that high power was associated 
with elevated mood in positive contexts but not in neutral contexts (see above). The 
association between low power was marginally weaker in positive contexts compared to 
neutral contexts, coeffD2xD3 = 0.31, SE = 0.16, p = .055, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.63], r = .19, as was 
suggested by the fact that low power depressed mood in neutral contexts but not in positive 
contexts (see prior analysis). Turning to negative contexts, the association high power was no 
different in negative contexts compared to neutral contexts, coeffD1xD4 = -0.15, SE = 0.21, p = 
.481, 95% CI [-0.55, 0.26], r = -.08. However, the association between low power and 
depressed mood was less pronounced in negative contexts compared to neutral contexts 
(although this effect was marginal), coeffD2xD4 = 0.41, SE = 0.23, p = .071, 95% CI [-0.04, 
0.86], r = .13; consistent with prior analysis suggesting that low power depressed mood in 
neutral contexts but not negative contexts. 
Variability in Mood between Contexts. To examine variations in mood between 
contexts, responses in neutral contexts were excluded and interactions involving dummies 
representing high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power and different contexts (i.e., 
D1xD3 and D2xD3) were examined (Table 6). High power was associated with greater 
variability in mood, coeffD1xD3 = 0.38, SE = 0.10, p = .064, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.80], r = .13, 




and variability in mood was in the expected direction, it did not reach significance, coeffD2xD3 






Study 2: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power in neutral contexts providing the reference category. Crucial hypothesis tests 
are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power, and high and low power x context interactions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 4.82*** 0.04 4.72 4.49   4.86*** 0.08 4.71 5.01 205.58 64.23 .98 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.10 0.11 -0.12 0.32 204.27 0.92 .06 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)      -0.26* 0.11 -0.48 -0.05 201.18 -2.40 -.17 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=neutral)       0.05 0.11 -0.16 0.26 97.74 0.47 .05 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=neutral)      -0.31* 0.15 -0.61 -0.02 92.08 -2.10 -.21 
 D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.19 0.15 -0.10 0.49 95.02 1.30 .13 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.15 0.21 -0.55 0.26 86.48 -0.71 -.08 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context       0.31 0.16 -0.01 0.63 96.35 1.94 .19 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.41 0.23 -0.04 0.86 84.64 1.83 .19 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.89*** 0.03 0.83 0.95   0.89*** 0.03 0.83 0.95 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.29*** 0.04 0.23 0.38   0.28*** 0.04 0.22 0.37 - - - 
Stimuli 0.15*** 0.03 0.11 0.21   0.16*** 0.03 0.11 0.21 - - - 
Random Slope Variance 
        
   
Positive Context  0.06 0.06 0.01 0.36   0.02 0.05 0.00 2.68 - - - 
Negative Context  0.31** 0.11 0.15 0.63   0.21* 0.09 0.08 0.50 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number of parameters) 9144.08(6)   9126.78(14) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from medium power at baseline/in neutral contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimates, whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded 






Study 2: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power in negative contexts providing the reference category. Crucial hypothesis 
tests are highlighted in bold: high and low power x context interactions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 4.78*** 0.07 4.63 4.91   4.44*** 0.15 4.15 4.74 206.44 29.98 .90 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.12 0.20 -0.28 0.52 187.39 0.60 .04 
D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)       0.19 0.22 -0.25 0.63 190.08 0.86 .06 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       0.34* 0.15 0.04 0.64 215.88 2.22 .15 
D1xD3: High Power x Context       0.38 0.21 -0.04 0.80 196.90 1.80 .13 
D2xD3: Low Power x Context      -0.09 0.23 -0.55 0.36 208.79 -0.40 -.03 
Variance Components            
Residual 1.14*** 0.08 1.00 1.30   1.11*** 0.07 0.97 1.26 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.25*** 0.07 0.14 0.43   0.25*** 0.07 0.15 0.42 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.09 0.09 0.02 0.57   0.01 0.07 0.00 18268
.95 
- - - 
Fit Statistics           
ML deviance (number of parameters) 1995.49(4)   1784.63(9) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the interaction between low- and high-power and context dummy variables 
(highlighted in bold) denote greater/lesser variability relative to medium power. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimates, whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both 





Study 2 sampled mood in the moment across a seven day period, adding to the 
mounting evidence suggesting that low power dampens mood at baseline/in neutral contexts, 
and high power elevates mood in positive contexts. Consistent with Studies 1a and 1b there 
was no effect of high or low power on mood in negative contexts. Inconsistent with Studies 
1a and 1b, there was no discernible effect of high power in neutral contexts, nor of low power 
in positive contexts. Lastly, high power was again found to be associated with greater 
variability in mood, although this effect was marginally significant. However, low power was 
not associated with lesser variability.  
The fact that Study 2 did not replicate all the previous findings could be due to 
differences in the experimental design. Ecological assessment typically trades experimental 
control for ecological validity, resulting in a greater noise-to-signal ratio and therefore a less 
sensitive statistical test (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Stone & 
Neale, 1982). A comparison of the standard errors derived from the meta-analysis of Studies 
1a and 1b with the results obtained in Study 2 is consistent with this explanation (SEmeta <  
0.11, SEStudy2 > 0.11). Lastly, the results may reflect natural variations between samples. 
Indeed, the size of the effects across Studies 1-2 are small to small-to-medium (Cohen, 1992), 
and therefore should not be expected to consistently arise in all samples (even when samples 
DUHDVVXPHGWREH³DGHTXDWHO\´SRZHUHG%DNNHU+DUWJHULQN:LFKHUWV	YDQGHU0DDV
2016; Cohen, 1992). Such concerns can be largely dispelled by meta-analysing multiple 
samples (an approach we subsequently employ; Cumming, 2014). As such, we refrain from 
stating any firm conclusions at this point. Moving forward we sought to isolate the effects of 




3.4. Studies 3 and 4: Mood in Response to Music and Images 
Three correlational studies (Studies 1a, 1b and 2) probed the relationship between 
chronic feelings of power, context and mood. The final two studies (Studies 3 and 4) 
experimentally manipulate power to provide causal evidence for the impact of power on 
mood. Participants were primed with a high-power, low-power, or neutral mind-set (Study 3; 
Galinsky et al., 2003) or assigned a role (high power vs. low power vs. no role) in a group 
task (Study 4; Guinote, 2007c). Participants then reported their mood at baseline and after 
listening to short music experts (Study 3) or viewing images (Study 4) that differed in 
valence. In addition, Study 4 measured facial expressions associated with momentary mood 
(i.e., positive-smile, negative-frown; Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986). Facial expression (via 
EMG) provides an unobtrusive measure of low-level mood that may occur outside of 
awareness (Tassinary & Cacioppo, 1992). Due to the similarity in the measures of power and 
operationalisations of context in Studies 3 and 4, we approach the presentation and analysis 
of the results in a similar fashion to that of Studies 1a and 1b. 
Methods 
Participants and Design 
Study 3. Two-hundred and nineteen students from the School of Psychology, 
University of Kent participated in exchange for course credits. Twenty-two participants were 
excluded due to: not adhering to the procedure (n = 3), identifying the aim of the study (n = 
18; see Table A1 for supporting information and further details on excluded participants) or 
equipment error (n =1), leaving a final sample of 197 participants (154 female; Mage = 19.75, 
SD = 3.35). 
Study 4. One-hundred and ninety-three students from the School of Psychology, 
University of Kent participated in exchange for course credits and the chance to win £50 in a 




aim of the study (n = 4; see also Table A1) or requesting to prematurely end the study (n = 2), 
leaving a final sample of 184 participants (138 female; Mage = 19.74, SD = 3.08). 
Design. Study 3 and Study 4 followed mixed designs. Power was manipulated between 
participants (low vs. control vs. high) and contexts were manipulated within participants 
(negative vs. neutral vs. positive). 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were invited to take part in a study on music perception (Study 3) or virtual 
communication (Study 4). Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated 
individually in front of a computer. To manipulate different levels of power, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, in which they were asked to describe a 
past event where they felt powerful, powerless, or a neutral event (Study 3; Galinsky et al., 
2003) or were led to believe they would take part in a group task with a second participant 
(Study 4; Guinote, 2007c). For the group task, participants in the high and low power 
conditions were informed that they would either be assigned a Director or Worker role; 
entailing differential power (see Guinote, 2007c). The Director was asked to lead the group 
task and was granted six lottery tickets (for a £50 draw) irrespective of their performance in 
the task. The Worker was asked to take a subordinate role in the group task, and was told they 
would be granted as many lottery tickets as the Director deemed commensurate with their 
performance (from 2-8). In reality, all participants were granted one lottery ticket. No roles 
were mentioned for participants in the medium power condition. Following the power 
manipulations, participants indicated how much control and influence they had in the recalled 
event or assigned role (1=not at all, 9=very much). These items served as manipulation 
checks. Participants in Study 4 also indicated how they were currently feeling (1=very sad, 
very bad, very tense, 7=very happy, very good, very relaxed, very content). Participants were 




valence (Table 8; Tables A26, A27, A29 and A30). In Study 3 participants listened to 25 (1 
neutral, 12 positive, 12 negative) music excerpts (30s duration) played twice successively 
through a pair of over-ear headphones at a loud but comfortable volume (~70dB). The music 
excerpts were selected from a pool of 75 orchestral, modern, rock, pop and dance tracks 
gathered from various online sources (see also Table A26) on the basis of their pre-test 
ratings of valence and arousal. Twenty students (18 female, Mage = 19.00, SD = 2.20) rated 
each excerpt on valence and arousal from 1 (negative; calm) to 9 (positive; excited) using the 
Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Three groups of excepts were formed 
along the dimension of valence: negative (M = 3.52, SD = 1.30), neutral (M = 5.50, SD = 
1.40), and positive (M = 6.55, SD = 0.89), F(2, 38) = 41.98, p < .001, Șp2 = .69 (see also 
Table A29). 
In Study 4, participants viewed 48 (16 positive, 16 neutral, 16 negative) images (6s 
viewing time) selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008) on the basis of their valence ratings: negative (M = 2.37, SD = 0.54), neutral 
(M = 5.04, SD = 0.19), and positive (M = 7.55, SD = 0.54), F(2, 45) = 481.36, p < .001, Șp2 = 
.96 (see also Table A30). Following each stimulus presentation participants reported their 
mood from 1 (negative) to 9 (positive) using the Self-Assessment Manikin²a pictorial self-
report measure of mood (Bradley & Lang, 1994).  
In addition to the procedure described above, in Study 4 participants¶ zygomaticus 
(smile) muscle and corrugator (brow) muscle activation was recorded using facial 
electromyography throughout the entire session. Activation in the zygomaticus muscle is 
typically evoked by positive states (i.e., joy, happiness and amusement) and activation of the 
corrugator muscle by negative states (i.e., disgust, fear, anger, and sadness; see Reisenzein, 
Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). Thus, Study 4 also provided a behavioural index of positive 




(BIOPAC Systems, Santa Barbara, CA) at 2000Hz throughout the entire study. Electric 
potentials were sampled via Ag-AgCl electrodes filled with NaCl gel, placed on the 
Zygomatic (right cheek) and Corrugator (right brow; see Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986 for 
exact placement). Raw EMG activity was filtered (High: 10Hz; Low: 500Hz) and then 
amplified (x5000). An electrode placed on the right finger served as a ground. 
Results 
Data Preparation 
The two manipulation-check items measuring power (rs > .76) and the four items (a = 
.90, M = 4.61, SD = 1.11) measuring mood at baseline in Study 4 were collapsed. 
Physiological data were reduced off-line using AcqKnowledge Software (Version 4.1). Trials 
in which there was reason to believe the recordings were unreliable (e.g., due to movement) 
were identified through visual inspection and discarded prior to the data analysis. Facial 
muscle activity was rectified, as per Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). The average activity in 
the one second before each image presentation was then subtracted from the average activity 
whilst image-viewing (full six seconds), separately for each trial, and for zygomaticus and 
corrugator. 
Manipulation Check 
Power. As shown in Table 7, participants felt more powerful following the high 
power manipulations compared to the control. Participants also felt more powerless following 
the low power prime compared to the control. Thus, the priming (Study 3) and role 









Studies 3 and 4: Feelings of power following low, control and high power manipulations.  
 Power  
Sample Low Control High Power main effect 
Study 3 2.60a(1.40) 4.46b(1.68) 7.57c(1.08) F(2, 194) = 193.21, p < .001, Șp2 = .67 
Study 4 3.54a(1.51) 5.06b(1.07) 7.51c(1.17) F(2, 181) = 156.17, p < .001, Șp2 = .63 
NB: Observed means and standard deviations in parentheses. Higher values indicate greater 
feelings of power. Means not sharing a common subscript within rows are significantly 





Context. 7KHPXVLFH[FHUSWV6WXG\DQGLPDJHV6WXG\VXFFHVVIXOO\LQIOXHQFHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶PRRG3DUWLFLSDQWVreported greater 
positive mood following positive stimuli, and greater negative mood following negative stimuli, compared to neutral stimuli. Facial displays 
were also consistent with self-reported mood, participants smiled more towards positive stimuli than towards neutral or negative stimuli, and 
frowned more towards negative stimuli than towards neutral or positive stimuli (Table 8). 
Table 8. 
Studies 3 and 4: Indices of mood in different contexts. 
 Context  
Sample Negative Neutral Positive Valence main effect 
Study 3 (self-report)  4.38a(1.51)  5.56b(1.51)  6.04c(0.86) F(2, 392) = 114.27, p < .001, Șp2 = .37 
Study 4 (self-report)  2.71a(0.95)  5.12b(0.52)  6.76c(0.75) F(2, 366) = 1213.22, p < .001, Șp2 = .87 
Study 4 (zygomaticus activation) -0.17a(0.21) -0.11a(0.28)  0.28b(0.92) F(2, 366) = 38.67, p < .001, Șp2 = .18 
Study 4 (corrugator activation)  0.11a(0.37) -0.06b(0.38) -0.05b(0.57) F(2, 366) = 7.54, p = .001, Șp2 = .04 
NB: Observed means and standard deviations in parentheses. Higher values indicate more positive mood. Means not sharing a common subscript 




Main Analysis  
As in Studies 1a and 1b, we chose to focus on overall variations in mood at the meta-
level (across Studies 3 and 4), so as to identify trends that generalise across studies 
(Cumming, 2012, 2014). A random slope and intercept model with homogeneous variances 
was fitted to the mood data (descriptive statistics are provided in Appendices, Tables A7 and 
A8). Random effect coefficients allowed intercepts to vary across participants and stimuli. 
Slopes were allowed to vary within participants and between contexts (negative vs. neutral 
vs. positive). Fixed effect dummy coefficients compared high (D1=1, D2=0) and low (D2=0, 
D2=1) power with control participants, and positive (D3=1, D4=0) and negative (D3=0, D4=1) 
contexts with neutral contexts. A fixed effect contrast coefficient (Study 3=1, Study 4=-1) 
modelled between-study variance. $GGLQJWKHVHIL[HGHIIHFWVLPSURYHGWKHPRGHOILW¨-2LL 
= 160.08, df = 13, p < .001. Variance estimates and crucial hypothesis tests are presented 
below (Table 9).  
Mood in Different Contexts. As in previous analyses we examined coefficients 
estimating the effects of high (vs. control) and low (vs. control) power (D1, D2) in neutral 
contexts. Across Studies 3 and 4, high power did not elevate mood, coeffD1 = 0.04, SE = 0.09, 
p = .407, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.22], r = .02. Low power, on the other hand, depressed mood, 
coeffD2 = -0.18, SE = 0.08, p = .038, 95% CI [-0.35, -0.01], r = -.07.  
Context dummy variables were again re-coded to provide simple effects of high (vs. 
control) and low (vs. control) power in positive contexts (neutral: D3 = 1, positive: D3 = 0) 
and negative contexts (neutral: D4 = 1, negative: D4 = 0; see Tables A16 and A17 for full 
variance estimates). In positive contexts, high power elevated mood, coeffD1 = 0.17, SE = 
0.09, p = .063, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.35], r = .10, whilst low power dampened mood, coeffD2 = -
0.16, SE = 0.09, p = .067, 95% CI [-0.34, 0.01], r = -.09, although both effects were 




depressed mood, coeffD1 = 0.09, SE = 0.12, p = .796, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.31], r = .04, coeffD2 = 
0.01, SE = 0.11, p = .926, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.23], r = .00. 
Going back to the initial model, we finally looked at the moderating role of context 
(D1xD3, D2xD3, D1xD4, D2xD4). Neither the effects of high power nor of low power were 
moderated by the valence of the context, coeffD1xD3 = 0.13, SE = 0.11, p = .252, 95% CI [-
0.09, 0.35], r = .05, coeffD2xD3 = 0.03, SE = 0.11, p = .809, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.25], r = .01, 
coeffD1xD4 = 0.05, SE = 0.14, p = .727, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.33], r = .02, coeffD2xD4 = 0.19, SE = 
0.14, p = .167, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.46], r = .06.  
Variability in Mood between Contexts. To provide an estimate of how much 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶PRRGYDULHGEHWZHHQFRQWH[WVZHH[FOXGHGUHVSRQses in neutral contexts and 
examined the interactions involving dummies representing different levels of power and 
different contexts (i.e., D1xD3 and D2xD3). As shown in Table 10, across Studies 3 and 4 
neither participants with high nor low power exhibited greater or lesser variability in their 
mood, coeffD1xD3 = 0.08, SE = 0.16, p = .610, 95% CI [-0.24, 0.77], r = .03, coeffD2xD3 = -








Studies 3 and 4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with control power in neutral contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power, and high and low power x context interactions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 5.00*** 0.18 4.65 5.35 
  5.39*** 0.24 4.91 5.86 74.45 22.67 .93 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=control)       0.04 0.09 -0.13 0.22 805.60 0.51 .02 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=control)      -0.18* 0.09 -0.35 -0.01 805.52 -2.08 -.07 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=neutral)       1.01*** 0.26 0.50 1.53 79.02 3.94 .41 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=neutral)      -1.88*** 0.26 -2.40 -1.35 86.98 -7.12 -.61 
 D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.13 0.11 -0.09 0.35 508.71 1.15 .05 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context       0.05 0.14 -0.23 0.33 504.15 0.35 .02 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context       0.03 0.11 -0.19 0.25 525.84 0.24 .01 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.19 0.14 -0.08 0.46 517.58 1.38 .06 
Fixed Effects (Study)     
       
Study     
  0.31 0.24 -0.16 0.79 73.31 1.33 .15 
Study x High Power     
 -0.06 0.08 -0.22 0.10 537.77 -0.75 -.03 
Study x Low Power     
 -0.22** 0.08 -0.38 -0.07 530.71 -2.84 -.12 
Study x Positive Context     
 -0.57* 0.25 -1.07 -0.07 69.34 -2.28 -.26 
Study x Negative Context     
  0.62* 0.25 0.12 1.12 71.83 2.46 .28 
Study x High Power x Positive Context     
 -0.06 0.13 -0.32 0.20 1175.27 -0.44 -.01 
Study x High Power x Negative Context     
  0.13 0.16 -0.18 0.44 809.71 0.84 .03 
Study x Low Power x Positive Context     
  0.15 0.13 -0.10 0.40 1120.25 1.21 .04 
Study x Low Power x Negative Context     
  0.12 0.15 -0.17 0.42 781.70 0.82 .03 
Variance Components            
Residual 1.08*** 0.01 1.06 1.11   1.08*** 0.01 1.06 1.11 - - - 





Participant  0.20*** 0.02 0.16 0.25   0.19*** 0.02 0.15 0.24 - - - 
Stimuli 2.15*** 0.37 1.54 3.01   0.20*** 0.03 0.14 0.28 - - - 
Random Slope Variance 
        
   
Positive Context  0.44*** 0.04 0.36 0.53   0.43*** 0.04 0.36 0.53 - - - 
Negative Context  0.86*** 0.07 0.72 1.02   0.86*** 0.07 0.72 1.01 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number of parameters) 42324.41(6)   42164.33(23) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the high- and low-power dummy variables denote deviations from controls in 
neutral contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, whereas regression coefficients are based 







Studies 3 and 4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood across, with control power in negative contexts providing the reference category. 
Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: high and low power x context interactions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 3.67*** 0.50 2.61 4.73   3.51*** 0.13 3.26 3.77 143.51 27.63 .92 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=control)       0.09 0.12 -0.14 0.33 373.01 0.77 .04 
D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=control)       0.01 0.12 -0.22 0.24 372.45 0.09 .00 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       2.89*** 0.18 2.54 3.24 133.64 16.41 .82 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.08 0.16 -0.24 0.40 378.01 0.50 .03 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context      -0.16 0.16 -0.47 0.15 378.53 -1.04 -.05 
Fixed Effects (Study)            
Study       0.88*** 0.13 0.63 1.14 143.07 6.96 .50 
Study x High Power       0.06 0.12 -0.18 0.29 368.63 0.46 .02 
Study x Low Power      -0.19 0.12 -0.42 0.04 368.10 -1.58 -.08 
Study x Positive Context      -1.19*** 0.15 -1.49 -0.89 74.72 -7.91 -.67 
Study x High Power x Positive Context      -0.19 0.16 -0.51 0.13 376.02 -1.17 -.06 
Study x Low Power x Positive Context       0.03 0.16 -0.28 0.34 375.37 0.19 .01 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.58*** 0.04 0.51 0.66   0.59*** 0.04 0.52 0.67 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.14*** 0.03 0.09 0.22   0.12** 0.03 0.08 0.20 - - - 
Stimuli 4.52*** 1.51 2.35 8.70   0.67*** 0.26 0.32 1.43 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.19*** 0.05 0.11 0.33   0.14** 0.05 0.07 0.28 - - - 
Fit Statistics            





NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the interaction between low- and high-power and context dummy variables 
(highlighted in bold) denote greater/lesser variability relative to controls. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimates, whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded 




Facial Muscle Activation in Different Contexts. Similar models were fit to the 
zygomaticus (smile) and corrugator (frown) data as was fitted to the mood data. Random 
effect coefficients allowed intercepts to vary across participants and stimuli. Slopes were 
allowed to vary within participants and between contexts (negative vs. neutral vs. positive). 
Fixed effect dummy coefficients compared high (D1=1, D2=0) and low (D2=0, D2=1) power 
with control participants, and positive (D3=1, D4=0) and negative (D3=0, D4=1) contexts with 
QHXWUDOFRQWH[WV$GGLQJWKHIL[HGHIIHFWVLPSURYHGWKHPRGHOILW¨-2LLzygomaticus = 10.84, df 
= 8, p ¨-2LLcurrogator = 31.10, df = 8, p < .001. 
We again looked at responses in neutral contexts first. Estimates of power (D1, D2) 
indicated that neither high (vs. control) nor low (vs. control) power increased smiling or 
frowning in response to neutral images, coeffD1zygomaticus = -0.00, SE = 0.10, p = .994, 95% CI 
[-0.20, 0.20], r = -.00, coeffD2zygomaticus = -0.06, SE = 0.10, p = .588, 95% CI [-0.26, 0.15], r = 
-.02, coeffD1currogator = 0.09, SE = 0.09, p = .359, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.27], r = .04. coeffD2currogator 
= 0.12, SE = 0.09, p = .190, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.31], r = .06.  
As smiling primarily occurred in positive contexts and frowning in negative contexts 
(see descriptive statistics in Appendix Tables A9 and A10), we probed the effects of power 
on smiling in positive contexts and on frowning in negative contexts. To this end, dummy 
variables representing contexts were coded such that 0 represented positive contexts for the 
zygomaticus data (neutral: D3 = 1, positive: D3 = 0) and 0 represented negative contexts for 
the corrugator data (neutral: D3 = 1, negative: D3 = 0). In this coding scheme dummy 
variables representing power (D1, D2) provide estimates of the effect of high (vs. control) and 
low (vs. control) power on smiling in positive contexts and on frowning in negative contexts 





Consistent with the self-report data showing that high power elevated mood in 
positive contexts, high power increased smiling in positive contexts, coeffD1 = 0.18, SE = 
0.10, p = .076, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.39], r = .08, although this effect was marginally significant. 
Although low (vs. control) power dampened mood in positive contexts (see previous section), 
low power did not decrease smiling in positive contexts, coeffD2 = 0.13, SE = 0.10, p = .211, 
95% CI [-0.07, 0.34], r = .05. Examining the frown-data, neither high nor low power 
increased or decreased frowning in negative contexts, consistent with SDUWLFLSDQWV¶self-
reported mood, coeffD1 = 0.15, SE = 0.09, p = .111, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.33], r = .07, coeffD2 = -

















Studies 4: Multi-level model predicting variations in zygomaticus (smile) activation, with control power in positive contexts providing the reference 
category. Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 0.00 0.04 -0.79 0.79   0.18* 0.08 0.01 0.34 405.35 2.11 .10 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=control)       0.18 0.10 -0.02 0.39 522.57 1.78 .08 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=control)       0.13 0.10 -0.07 0.34 522.57 1.25 .05 
D3: Neutral Context (1=neutral, 0=positive)      -0.27* 0.11 -0.49 -0.05 311.09 -2.40 -.13 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=positive)      -0.33** 0.11 -0.55 -0.11 311.09 -2.95 -.16 
 D1xD3: High Power x Neutral Context      -0.19 0.14 -0.45 0.08 360.00 -1.35 -.07 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.18 0.14 -0.45 0.09 360.00 -1.32 -.07 
D2xD3: Low Power x Neutral Context      -0.19 0.14 -0.46 0.08 360.00 -1.36 -.07 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context      -0.19 0.14 -0.46 0.08 360.00 -1.39 -.07 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.65*** 0.01 0.63 0.67   0.65*** 0.01 0.63 0.67 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.04   0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.04 - - - 
Stimuli 0.04*** 0.02 0.02 0.09   0.04*** 0.02 0.02 0.09 - - - 
Random Slope Variance 
        
   
Neutral Context  0.25*** 0.02 0.21 0.29   0.25*** 0.02 0.21 0.29 - - - 
Negative Context 0.22*** 0.02 0.19 0.27   0.21*** 0.02 0.19 0.27 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 22454.04(6)   22443.20(14) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from medium power at baseline/in neutral contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimates, whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded 






Studies 4: Multi-level model predicting variations in corrugator (frown) activation, with control power in negative contexts providing the reference 
category. Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.05   0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.21 499.25 1.12 .05 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=control)       0.15 0.09 -0.03 0.33 512.79 1.60 .07 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=control)      -0.04 0.09 -0.23 0.14 512.79 -0.45 -.02 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)      -0.22* 0.09 -0.40 -0.05 354.06 -2.54 -.13 
D4: Neutral Context (1=neutral, 0=negative)      -0.21* 0.09 -0.38 -0.03 354.06 -2.36 -.12 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context      -0.13 0.12 -0.37 0.11 360.00 -1.06 -.06 
D1xD4: High Power x Neutral Context      -0.06 0.12 -0.30 0.18 360.00 -0.52 -.03 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context       0.31* 0.12 0.07 0.55 360.00 2.54 .13 
D2xD4: Low Power x Neutral Context       0.17 0.12 -0.07 0.41 360.00 1.36 .07 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.77*** 0.01 0.74 0.79   0.77*** 0.01 0.74 0.79 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.04*** 0.01 0.02 0.08   0.04*** 0.01 0.02 0.08 - - - 
Stimuli 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 - - - 
Random Slope Variance 
        
   
Positive Context  0.16*** 0.03 0.11 0.21   0.16*** 0.03 0.11 0.21 - - - 
Neutral Context 0.11*** 0.03 0.06 0.17   0.11*** 0.03 0.06 0.17 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 23569.89(6)   23571.12(14) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from medium power at baseline/in neutral contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimates, whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded 





The findings of Studies 3 and 4 broadly echo previous results. Consistent with Studies 
1-2, we found that high power elevated mood in positive contexts, whilst low power 
dampened mood in neutral contexts and positive contexts, although the former effect was 
marginal. Furthermore, manipulating high and low power did not elevate or dampen mood in 
negative contexts²a consistent finding across all our studies. However, Studies 3 and 4 
found no significant effect of high power in neutral contexts, nor any effects of low or high 
power on mood variability; although these effects were all in the expected direction. 
Study 4 supplemented our findings with behavioural measures of mood²smiling and 
frowning. Consistent with the self-report data, high and low power participants did not differ 
in the amount they frowned in negative contexts. Furthermore, high power participants 
expressed their elevated mood in greater smiling in positive contexts. However, low power 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶GDPSHQHd mood did not result in less smiling in positive contexts. If anything, 
the direction of the effect implied they smiled somewhat more (coeffD2 = 0.13), suggesting 
that low power may lead to a dissociation between felt and expressed experiences. This 
would be consistent with the fact that self-reported mood predicts smiling in people with high 
power, but not in people with low power (M. A. Hecht & LaFrance, 1998). 
Although the findings do not conform unequivocally to our predictions, the observed 
effects are consistently in the expected direction, suggesting that the actual effect of power 
may be small, and therefore not arise in all samples. In the next section we leverage the 




3.5. Studies 1-4: Meta-Analysis of All Samples 
In what follows, we analyse overall variations in mood across all studies (Studies 1-
4). In doing so we seek to reconcile seemingly inconsistent findings across studies and 
provide a more robust test of our hypotheses (Cumming, 2012, 2014)2. Our combined 
analysis of 19,710 observations derived from 1,042 participants had more than 90% power to 
detect a small effect of power on mood (high vs. medium/control, low vs. medium/control). A 
random slope and intercept model with homogeneous variances was fitted to the mood data 
(descriptive statistics are provided in Appendices, Tables A4-A10). Random effect 
coefficients allowed intercepts to vary across participants, stimuli and samples, and slopes 
between contexts (negative vs. neutral/baseline vs. positive). Fixed effect dummy coefficients 
compared high (D1=1, D2=0) and low (D2=0, D2=1) with medium/control power, and positive 
(D3=1, D4=0) and negative (D3=0, D4=1) contexts with baseline/neutral contexts. Adding 
these fixed effects improved WKHPRGHOILW¨-2LL = 135.21, df = 8, p < .001. Variance 
estimates and relevant study- and meta-level fixed effects of power are presented below 
(Tables 13 and 14). 
Mood in Different Contexts. Across samples high (vs. medium/control) power 
elevated mood at baseline/in neutral contexts, coeffD1 = 0.12, SE = 0.06, p = .046, 95% CI 
[0.00, 0.23], r = .06, and low (vs. medium/control) power dampened mood at baseline/in 
neutral contexts, coeffD2 = -0.29, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.41, -0.18], r = -.14.  
To investigate the effects of high and low power in different contexts we recoded the 
context dummy variables so as to provide simple effects of power in positive (neutral: D3 = 1, 
positive: D3 = 0) and negative contexts (neutral: D4 = 1, negative: D4 = 0; see Tables A18 and 
A19 for full variance estimates). Looking at positive contexts, high power elevated mood, 
coeffD1 = 0.24, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 95% CI [0.13, 0.35], r = .11, and low power dampened 
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mood, coeffD2 = -0.20, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.09], r = -.10. Turning to 
negative contexts, we found no effect of high power or of low power on mood, coeffD1 = 
0.08, SE = 0.07, p = .241, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.21], r = .03, coeffD2 = -0.03, SE = 0.07, p = .619, 
95% CI [-0.16, 0.10], r = -.01,  
Lastly, as in previous analyses, we probed the interactions between power and context 
(D1xD3, D2xD3, D1xD4, D2xD4). The effects of high and low power in positive contexts were 
no different to those at baseline/in neutral contexts, coeffD1xD3 = 0.12, SE = 0.08, p = .129, 
95% CI [-0.03, 0.27], r = .04, coeffD2xD3 = 0.08, SE = 0.08, p = .286, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.23], r 
= .03. This is consistent with the fact that high power elevated and low power depressed 
mood both at baseline/in neutral contexts and in positive contexts (see prior analysis). The 
effect of high power was also no different in negative contexts (vs. at baseline/in neutral 
contexts), coeffD1xD4 = -0.05, SE = 0.09, p = .571, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.13], r = -.02. The effect 
of low power on mood was weaker in negative contexts than at baseline/in neutral contexts, 
coeffD2xD4 = 0.25, SE = 0.09, p = .005, 95% CI [0.07, 0.43], r = .07, as was suggested by the 
fact that low power depressed mood baseline/in neutral contexts but not in negative contexts 







Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium/control power at baseline/in neutral contexts providing the reference category. 
Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 4.35** 1.14 2.12 6.83   4.31** 0.72 2.20 6.42 3.50 6.01 .95 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium/control)       0.12* 0.06 0.00 0.23 1309.10 2.00 .06 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium/control)      -0.29*** 0.06 -0.41 -0.18 1256.02 -5.04 -.14 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=baseline/neu)       0.18 0.12 -0.05 0.41 1708.90 1.52 .04 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=baseline/neu)      -0.81*** 0.14 -1.08 -0.54 1462.54 -5.90 -.15 
 D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.12 0.08 -0.03 0.27 1454.12 1.52 .04 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.05 0.09 -0.23 0.13 1430.15 -0.57 -.02 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context       0.08 0.08 -0.07 0.23 1423.22 1.07 .03 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.25** 0.09 0.08 0.43 1392.20 2.79 .07 
Variance Components            
Residual 1.04*** 0.01 1.01 1.06   1.03*** 0.01 1.01 1.06 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance 
    
       
Participant  0.21*** 0.02 0.18 0.25   0.20*** 0.02 0.17 0.24 - - - 
Stimuli 2.45*** 0.37 1.82 3.29   1.37*** 0.25 0.95 1.96 - - - 
Study 1.27 1.24 0.19 8.58   2.37 1.94 0.48 11.77 - - - 
Random Slope Variance 
    
       
Positive Context  0.31*** 0.03 0.26 0.36   0.30*** 0.03 0.26 0.36 - - - 
Negative Context  0.60*** 0.04 0.53 0.69   0.61*** 0.04 0.53 0.70 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 54814.22(7)   54730.19(15) 
1%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deviations from medium/control power at baseline/in neutral contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood 






Studies 1-4: Summary of results. Variations in mood within negative, baseline/neutral, and positive contexts as a function of high (vs. medium/control) and 
low (vs. medium/control) power. 
  Negative Context  Baseline/Neutral Context  Positive Context 
Parameter/Study Coeff. SE     95% CI    r  Coeff.  SE     95% CI    r  Coeff.  SE    95% CI    r 
High Power (1=high, 0=medium/control)             
   Study 1a & 1b  0.03a 0.09 -0.14 0.20  .01   0.44b*** 0.10  0.25 0.64  .14   0.30b*** 0.08  0.14  0.46  .13 
   Study 2 -0.02a 0.18 -0.38 0.34 -.00   0.10a 0.11 -0.12 0.32  .06   0.33a* 0.16  0.01  0.65  .08 
   Study 3 & 4  0.09a 0.12 -0.14 0.32   .04   0.04a 0.09 -0.13 0.22  .02   0.17a 0.09 -0.01  0.35  .10 
   Study 1-4  0.08a  0.07 -0.05 0.21  .03   0.12a* 0.06  0.00 0.23  .06   0.24a*** 0.06  0.13  0.35  .11 
Low Power (1=low, 0=medium/control)              
   Study 1a & 1b -0.02a 0.09 -0.20 0.15 -.01  -0.82b*** 0.10 -1.02 -0.62 -.24  -0.25c** 0.08 -0.42 -0.09 -.11 
   Study 2  0.16a 0.20 -0.22 0.55  .02  -0.26b* 0.11 -0.48 -0.05 -.17   0.06a 0.17 -0.27  0.40  .01 
   Study 3 & 4  0.01a 0.11 -0.21 0.23  .00  -0.18a* 0.09 -0.35 -0.01 -.07  -0.16a 0.09 -0.33  0.02 -.09 
   Study 1-4 -0.03a 0.07 -0.16 0.10 -.01  -0.29b*** 0.06 -0.41 -0.18 -.14  -0.20b*** 0.06 -0.32 -0.09 -.10 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients above 0 indicate more positive mood, and coefficients below 0 indicate more 
negative mood, relative to medium power, which serves as a reference group. Coefficients not sharing a common subscript within rows are 
significantly different (p <  .05). Effect sizes are derived from t-YDOXHVDQGGHJUHHVRIIUHHGRPREWDLQHGWKURXJK6DWWHUWKZDLWH¶VDSSUR[LPDWLRQ




Variability in Mood between Contexts. Looking at KRZPXFKLQGLYLGXDOV¶PRRG
varied between contexts of opposing valence (Tables 14 and 15), we excluded responses at 
baseline/in neutral contexts and examined the interactions involving dummies representing 
different levels of power (low: D1=1, D2=0; high: D1=0, D2=0) and different contexts 
(negative: D3=0, positive: D3=1; D1xD3 and D2xD3). Across studies participants with high 
(vs. medium/control) power exhibited greater, coeffD1xD3 = 0.18, SE = 0.10, p = .064, 95% CI 
[-0.01, 0.37], r = .05, and participants with low (vs. medium/control) power less variability in 
their mood, coeffD2xD3 = -0.19, SE = 0.10, p = .049, 95% CI [-0.38, -0.00], r = -.06, although 






Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, excluding responses at baseline/in neutral contexts. Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in 
bold: interactions between high and low power and context. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 2.46* 0.72 0.42 4.50   2.46* 0.72 0.42 4.50 3.75 3.43 .87 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.21 1130.37 0.99 .03 
D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)      -0.01 0.07 -0.15 0.13 1100.79 -0.15 -.00 
D3: Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       3.06*** 0.20 2.67 3.46 84.37 15.36 .86 
D1xD3: High Power x Context       0.18 0.10 -0.01 0.37 1176.40 1.85 .05 
D2xD3: Low Power x Context      -0.19* 0.10 -0.38 0.00 1144.71 -1.97 -.06 
Variance Components            
Residual 1.04*** 0.01 1.02 1.06   1.14*** 0.02 1.11 1.17 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.44*** 0.03 0.39 0.49   0.50*** 0.03 0.44 0.57 - - - 
Stimuli 1.46*** 0.26 1.03 2.07   0.66 0.12 0.47 0.94 - - - 
Study 1.27 1.24 0.19 8.58   2.37*** 1.87 0.50 11.11 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Context  0.78*** 0.05 0.69 0.89   0.85*** 0.05 0.75 0.96 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 43252.21(6)   42291.21(11) 
1%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Studies 1-4: Summary of results. Variations in mood between positive and negative contexts as 
function of high (vs. medium/control) and low (vs. medium/control) power. 
Parameter/Study Coeff. SE      95% CI   r 
High (vs. Medium/Control) Power * Context (Neg. vs. Pos.) 
   Study 1a & 1b  0.29* 0.11  0.08 0.49 .10 
   Study 2  0.38 0.21 -0.04 0.80 .13 
   Study 3 & 4  0.08 0.16 -0.24 0.40 .03 
   Study 1-4  0.18 0.10 -0.01 0.37 .05 
Low (vs. Medium/Control) Power * Context (Neg. vs. Pos.) 
   Study 1a & 1b -0.23* 0.11 -0.44 -0.01 -.09 
   Study 2 -0.09 0.23 -0.55 0.36 -.03 
   Study 3 & 4 -0.16 0.16 -0.47 0.15 -.05 
   Study 1-4 -0.19* 0.10 -0.38 -0.00 -.06 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients above 0 indicate greater 
variability in mood, and coefficients below 0 indicate lesser variability in mood, relative to 





The present chapter presented the empirical work. Five studies tested the predictions 
derived from the Approach-Inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003) and Situated (Guinote, 2007a) 
Models of power. Power was operationalised via chronic (Studies 1a, 1b and 2) and 
temporary (Studies 3 and 4) feelings of power; contextual valence (negative vs. neutral vs. 
positive) via imagined situations (Studies 1a and 1b), everyday experiences (Study 2), music 
(Study 3) and images (Study 4). Meta analysing the results across studies (Studies 1-4), high 
power elevated mood and low power depressed mood at baseline/in neutral contexts and in 
positive contexts. Neither high nor low power influenced mood in negative contexts. High 
power increased, and low power decreased variability in mood between contexts of opposing 
valence (although the former effect was marginally significant). The next chapter will discuss 






CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
4.1. Overview 
Chapter 4 discusses the empirical work. The findings are first summarised. Moving 
on, potential strengths and limitations are addressed. The findings are then discussed in 
reference to prominent theories of power. Avenues for future research are highlighted 




4.2. Summary of the Current Research 
Previous data paint an unclear picture of the relationship between power and mood. 
Some studies report that power elevates mood (e.g., Langner & Keltner, 2008) whilst others 
report no effect on mood (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003). Informed by theoretical models of 
power (Guinote, 2007a; Keltner et al., 2003), the present research tested the relationship 
between power and mood within, and across, contexts. We posed two questions: Does high 
power elevate mood and low power depress mood (Keltner et al., 2003)? And does power 
increase variability in mood across contexts of opposing valence (Guinote, 2007a)?  
Five studies were conducted, employing different operationalisations of power 
(individual differences, priming, role assignment) and context (imagined contexts, ecological 
assessment/circadian rhythm, music- and image-induction), and sampling a large number of 
stimuli of differing valence (negative vs. neutral vs. positive). Two initial studies (Studies 1a 
and 1b) looked at the relationship between chronic feelings of power and mood in imagined 
contexts, finding that high power was associated with elevated mood, and low power with 
depressed mood at baseline and in positive contexts. No differences between levels of power 
were found in negative contexts. Studies 1a and 1b also found that high power was associated 
with greater variability in mood, and low with lesser variability in mood between imagined 
contexts of opposing valence (negative vs. positive). A third study (Study 2) sampled mood 
in everyday life, replicating most, but not all, of the previous findings. A final two studies 
(Studies 3 and 4) examined the relationship between momentary feelings of power and mood 
in response to music and images, also largely corroborating the effects observed in Studies 1a 
and 1b. 
Meta-analysing all the available data (Studies 1-4), we found that high power elevated 
mood at baseline/in neutral contexts and in positive contexts, but not in negative contexts. 




positive contexts, but not in negative contexts. Overall, high power (marginally) increased 
variability in mood, and low power decreased variability in mood, between contexts of 
opposing valence. 
Broadly speaking, the findings are consistent with the view that high power elevates 
mood and low power depresses mood (Keltner et al., 2003). However, the results offer crucial 
caveats, highlighting the importance of contextual factors. In particular, power may only 
bolster mood in neutral and in positive contexts, but not in negative contexts. That is, power 
may only exert an effect on mood in contexts that are perceived as hedonically neutral, or 
pleasant/enjoyable. The findings also support the idea that high power increases and low 
power decreases variability in mood (Guinote, 2007a). In what follows we will discuss the 






4.3. Strengths and Limitations 
This section discusses pertinent strengths and limitations of the research. We begin 
with a discussion of the statistical and methodological approach; including statistical power 
and meta-analyses, analysing across operationalisations of power, and potential floor effects 
in negative contexts. Lastly, we provide an interpretation of observed effect size(s). 
Statistical and Methodological Approach 
The present research adopts µQHZ¶GDWD-analytic and methodological approaches 
(Cumming, 2012, 2014) in an attempt to increase replicability (see Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). The research follows recommendations to reduce researcher degrees of 
freedom, by reporting all measures and exclusions (Ioannidis, 2005; Pashler & 
Wagenmakers, 2012). Results are also provided on inclusion (see Appendix, Tables A1-A4).  
Efforts were made to ensure that researcher-beliefs did not affect outcomes (see Gilder & 
Heerey, 2018). In Study 3 the experimenter was fully blind to the conditions, and in Study 4 
the experimenter did not interact with participants following the role-assignment procedure. 
Further strengthening our methodological approach, the research meta-analyses data across a 
large number of participants (N = 1046), ensuring a high (>90%) probability of detecting a 
small effect of power on mood (J. Cohen, 1992).  
The present results suggest that the size of the relationship between power (high vs. 
low) and mood is small-to-medium (r § .20), requiring a relatively large (>200) sample to be 
reliably detected (80%). As previous samples were insufficiently powered (~50%) to reliably 
detect a small-to-medium effect (N<100; but see Bombari et al., 2017; Smith & Hofmann, 
2016), the present findings suggest that variations in statistical power may, to some degree, 
account for the inconsistent findings in the literature (Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Bombari, 
Schmid Mast, & Bachmann, 2017; Côté & Moskowitz, 2002; M. A. Hecht & LaFrance, 




Wojciszke & Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007; c.f. Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fast et al., 2012; 
Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote et al., 2012; Overbeck & Droutman, 2013; Rucker & Galinsky, 
2008; Pamela K. Smith & Bargh, 2008; Pamela K. Smith & Trope, 2006; Weick & Guinote, 
2008, 2010).  
Meta-analysing data derived from individual-difference measures (i.e., chronic 
feelings of power; Studies 1-2) and momentary states (i.e., temporary feelings of power; 
Studies 3-4) prompts discussion. Creating tertiles in Study 1-2 may have reduced our 
statistical power (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). However, because this 
method allows us to analyse across all available samples and thereby maximize statistical 
power, we maintain that this is a worthwhile trade-off. The fact that feelings of power 
differed in the expected manor within all samples (see Table A11), and that it is a common 
meta-analytic approach to combine information from continuous and categorical variables 
that tap into the same underlying construct (e.g., Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002; Ozer, Best, 
Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003), also supports our cumulative approach. 
If causal claims are to be made, it is important that the overall effect of power on 
mood (Studies 1-4) is not solely driven by a correlation between power and mood (Studies 1-
2). This seems unlikely. Differences in mood between low and medium power in Studies 1-2 
were replicated when experimentally manipulating low power in Studies 3-4. Although 
differences in mood between high and medium power did not reach conventional levels of 
significance in Studies 3-4, the effects were in the expected direction and, crucially, were not 
significantly different from the effects observed in Studies 1-2 (Table 11; see also Table A20 
for model estimating differences in the effects of high and low power between Studies 1-2 
and Studies 3-4). As such, the meta-analytic results likely reflect a causal relationship 




It is important to address the possibility that the null effects of power observed in 
negative contexts may reflect floor effects. That is, responses to self-report measures can, in 
extreme (e.g., exceedingly negative) contexts, fail to provide adequate response-options for 
participants to express their feelings. In such cases, null effects between groups may no 
longer reflect phenomena of interest but rather a failure to accurately capture differences at 
scale-endpoints (for in-depth discussion see Groth-Marnat, 1997). An examination of 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶UHVSRQVHVVHH7DEOHV$-A8) indicates that it is unlikely that participants were 
constrained by the self-report measures in negative contexts (at least no more than they were 
constrained in positive contexts). There was ample room for participants to express greater 
negative mood in negative contexts, if desired. In fact, participants had less µKHDGURRP¶WR
express changes in mood in positive contexts. Thus, floor or ceiling effects cannot account 
for the patterns of results observed in the present studies.  
Previous research provides some indication that the effects of high and low power are 
not necessarily linear (Côté & Moskowitz, 2002; M. A. Hecht & LaFrance, 1998; Wojciszke 
& Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007). With this in mind, the present research attempted to pry 
apart the effects of high and low power by making comparisons with medium/control levels 
of power. This approach counters a trend of comparing high and low levels of power and 
framing results in terms of high power (du Plessis et al., 2016). Estimating the independent 
effects of high (vs. medium) and low (vs. medium) power on mood suggests the effects were 
small (rs = .06 to .14), and may not arise in all samples. However, it is important to note that 
comparing between the two ends of the power spectrum (high vs. low; see Tables A20-A23) 
revealed a more sizable effect of power on mood at baseline/in neutral and positive context 
(rs = .23 and .25, respectively), but not in negative contexts (r = .06).  
When considering effect sizes, it is important to note that the choice and presentation 




conservative estimates of the effects of power on mood. Such stimuli provide strong mood 
cues, likely prompting unambiguous responses, minimising differences between individuals 
(Fiske et al., 2010). More subtle cues may allow for greater differences to manifest between 
individuals. Similarly, as our studies (bar Study 2) randomly sampled contexts of differing 
valence in relatively swift succession, carry-over effects may have weakened the effects of 
power. Future studies may wish to examine how more subtle and/or enduring contexts affect 
the relationship between power and mood. 
In sum, the statistical and methodological approach lends some major strengths to the 
programme of research, affording reliable estimates of the relationship between power and 
mood. The approach allows for independent estimates of high and low power, whilst also 
highlighting a sizeable effect of high versus ORZSRZHURQSHRSOH¶VPRRG,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ
we discuss the generalisability of the research. 
Generalisability 
The present research answers potential concerns regarding stimuli sampling and 
external validity (Judd et al., 2012). Psychological research often aggregates responses across 
a handful of stimuli representing a category of interest. That is, researchers assume that the 
chosen stimuli adequately represent most (if not all) instances of the category of interest, and 
generalise accordingly. However, this is not necessarily the case. Just as participant-sampling 
should be taken into account when generalising to wider populations, so should stimuli-
sampling. Failure to take into account variation between stimuli can undermine 
generalisability and can increase the likelihood of a Type 1 error (Rietveld & Van Hout, 
2007; Wickens & Keppel, 1983). By utilizing numerous operationalisations of power and 
context, and by modelling a large number (i = 114) of stimuli representing positive, negative 
and neutral contexts the present research appreciates these limitations and provides the most 




Our conclusions derive primarily from European samples (and one U.S. sample), and 
may therefore not generalise to East-Asian cultures. Collectivist cultures have different 
beliefs about the emotional effects of power (Mondillon et al., 2005), and these beliefs may 
reflect differing goals and expectations associated with power. In vertical societies, power is 
likely to be viewed as a means to attain personally desirable goals, whereas in collectivist 
societies power is likely to be viewed in terms of responsibility towards others (Torelli & 
Shavitt, 2010). As feelings of responsibility and obligation are related to negative mood (Deci 
& Ryan, 2010), and in some cases µEXUQ-RXW¶(Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001), power 
may have differential effects on mood across cultures. Indeed, there is some indication that 
power does not increase life satisfaction and authenticity in eastern cultures (Datu & Reyes, 
2015). Thus, although the present research takes an important step towards understanding the 
effects of power on mood, further research is needed to examine whether the findings 






The next section discusses how the present findings inform our understanding of 
power. The findings are first discussed in relation to theoretical predictions (Guinote, 2007a; 
Keltner et al., 2003). We first discuss how the findings relate to the relationship between 
power, variability and reliance on subjective experiences. Points of integration between the 
Approach-Inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003) and Situated (Guinote, 2007a) Models of Power 
are highlighted. Lastly, a number of real-world and societal implications are discussed. 
The findings largely support the Approach-Inhibition Theory of Power (Keltner et al., 
2004), demonstrating a link between power and a prominent hallmark of the approach-
inhibition systems; positive and negative mood (e.g., Gray, 1987). Power elevated mood at 
baseline/in neutral and positive contexts, suggesting that power reliably activates the 
approach-system in these contexts. This aligns well with the fact that power prompts greater 
approach motivation and action in neutral/positive situations; that is, situations with 
approach-related goals and without threats (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007c; 
Maner et al., 2010; Smith & Bargh, 2008). Crucially, the findings also point to the 
moderating role of contextual factors. 
The (null) findings in negative contexts add to a comparatively small body of research 
investigating how power moderates responses in threatening and unpleasant contexts (for 
review see Deng et al., 2018), suggesting that inhibitory processes can occasionally be 
comparable across levels of power. For example, when social hierarchies are threatening to 
the powerful (e.g., when unstable or illegitimate), high and low power may inhibit action and 
risk-taking equally (Lammers et al., 2008; Maner et al., 2007). The present research suggests 
that this may reflect a general trend for the powerful to be equally attuned to threats and 
unpleasant features of the context (perhaps due to equal activation of the inhibition system). 




inhibition and negative mood in negative contexts; Guinote, 2007a), it is consistent with 
EURDGHUµVLWXDWHG¶YLHZV, in which cognition provides an on-line adaptive response to the 
environment (Barsalou, 1999), and with the fact that negative stimuli are typically stronger 
drivers of cognition than positive stimuli (Baumeister et al., 2001). All in all, the results 
highlight a need for further research to clearly define the role of the approach-inhibition 
systems in the effects of power, particularly with regards to the moderating role of contextual 
factors (i.e., safe/positive vs. threatening/negative). 
Despite the fact that power did not lead to greater negative mood in negative contexts, 
the findings nevertheless suggest that power increases variability in mood, supporting a 
central prediction of the Situated Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a). The findings also 
provide important qualifications showing that much of this greater variability may, in fact, 
derive from low (vs. PHGLXPFRQWUROSRZHUUHQGHULQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶PRRGPRUHXQLIRUm 
across contexts. This finding provide the first demonstration that high and low power may 
have differential effects on variability (affective or otherwise), aligning with a body of work 
suggesting that lacking power may be more psychologically impactful than having power 
(Rucker & Galinsky, 2008; P. K. Smith et al., 2008; Weick, Wilkinson, & Guinote, 2011; 
Wilkinson et al., 2010). Related to the previous point, the findings support recent pushes for 
greater theoretical and empirical rigour in prying apart the effects of high and low power (du 
Plessis et al., 2016).  
The findings also align well with previous research demonstrating that the cognitive 
and behavioural variability typically associated with power (e.g., Guinote et al., 2002) 
extends to mood as well (see also Guinote, 2008). As mood often drives judgement and 
behaviour (Lewis et al., 2008), this suggests that the variability associated with power may be 
partly accounted for by variability in mood. This is particularly likely in domains which rely 




judgements; Haidt, 2001) and representations of the self (R. E. Wilson, Thompson, & Vazire, 
2017). The later would be curious to investigate as, contrary to previous observations (Kraus 
et al., 2011), may reveal that power can in some cases increase variations in self-
representations across time and/or contexts. 
The IDFWWKDWKLJKDQGORZSRZHULQGLYLGXDOV¶PRRGZDVVLPLODUO\GDPSHQHGLQ
negative contexts means the variability associated with power may be attributed to the mood-
bolstering effects of power in positive contexts. Given that positive mood is a marker of 
approach motivation (Gray, 1987), one implication of these findings is that approach 
motivation may be one of the mechanisms through which power fosters greater variability in 
judgement and behaviour. Thus, greater behavioural variability associated with power is 
likely to be more noticeable across situations which differentially activate the approach 
system. 
Lastly, as stronger and more unequivocal mood states are more likely to drive 
behaviour than weaker and more diffuse states (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2010), the 
present findings point to positive mood (and perhaps also approach motivation) as a route 
through which power may increase the correspondence between indiviGXDOV¶IHHOLQJVDQG
behaviour (see Guinote, 2010; Weick & Guinote, 2008; Woltin & Guinote, 2015). Indeed, 
participants with high power show a greater correspondence between positive mood and 
expressions of happiness (i.e., smiling), compared to those with low power (M. A. Hecht & 
LaFrance, 1998). Future research may wish to examine if a similar relationship extends to 
expressions of negative mood. 
All in all, the findings point to approach motivation as a key process underlying the 
effects of power (Keltner et al., 2003). This line of reasoning also highlights points of 
integration across prominent models of power. Crucial predictions derived from theoretical 




related processes. That is, approach motivation leads to a greater attentional focus, increases 
attentional flexibility, and greater goal-focus, consistent with core tenants of the Situated 
Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, 2007a; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 2013).  
Moving beyond theoretical implications, the findings highlight a potential error in 
SHRSOH¶Vintuitions regarding the psychological benefits of power. On average, people believe 
that power will bring them happiness (Mondillon et al., 2005), and may even be 
µintoxicating¶. George Orwell in 1984 wrote: ³Always there will be the intoxication of power, 
constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler. Always, at every moment, there will be 
the thrill of victory, the sensation of trampling on an enemy who is helpless." (Orwell, 1949, 
p. 307). The present research suggests that power elevates mood in many contexts, however 
the effect of power was relatively small and would KDUGO\MXVWLI\WREHFDOOHGµintoxicating¶
These results echo recent work suggesting that people may overestimate the benefits of 
having power (Leach, Weick, & Lammers, 2017), and suggest that much of the hedonic 
utility of power may derive from how power interacts with opportunities and rewards in the 
environment. 
In a broader sense, the findings may have implications for society at large. There is a 
growing sentiment that policy objectives should be aligned with, and informed by, research 
on mood and well-being (Diener, 2000). As there is some indication that the hedonic benefits 
of power may be outweighed by the detrimental effects of powerlessness (rHighPower = .06, 
rLowPower = -WKHILQGLQJVVXJJHVWWKDWRQHZD\RIHOHYDWLQJDSRSXODWLRQ¶VZHOO-being may 
EHWRDWWHPSWWRIODWWHQSRZHUGLIIHUHQFHV7KLVµEDGLVVWURQJHUWKDQJRRG¶%DXPHLVWHU et al., 
2001) view of power aligns with the fact that powerlessness typically evokes stronger 
behavioural signatures of negative affect than power evokes signatures of positive affect 
(Maier & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Seligman, 1975). Looking at country-level indices of 




differences between those who enjoy power and those who do not are associated with lower 
levels of well-being than countries with lesser differences (Berg & Veenhoven, 2010; see also 
Schneider, 2016). Although the aforementioned data may reflect objective differences in 
circumstances (e.g., levels of corruption; Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme, 2002), the 
present findings suggest that inequalities in feelings of power may, in some part, contribute to 
country-level differences in well-being. All in all, the present research points to power as a 
potentially important construct in explaining group-level differences in well-being. 
In sum, the findings largely support the theoretical predictions of the Approach-
Inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003) and Situated (Guinote, 2007a) Models of Power: that power 
elevates mood and increases variability in mood, respectively (although it is important to note 
that the effect of high power on variability was marginally significant). The fact that power 
did not affect mood in negative contexts suggests a need for further work to investigate how 
power affects responses to threats and unpleasant contexts (see also Deng et al., 2018). The 
findings highlight a point of overlap across prominent theories of power, and contribute to 
recent work (Guinote, 2017). Lastly, the findings point to discrepancies between how power 
is perceived and experienced, and highlight how power may contribute to group-level 





Identifying inconsistencies and limitations in the literature, the current programme of 
research set out to test multiple theoretical predictions regarding the links between power, 
mood and context. The Approach-Inhibition Theory (Keltner et al., 2003) suggests that power 
elevates mood, whilst the Situated Theory (Guinote, 2007a) suggests that power increases 
variability in mood across contexts of opposing valence (negative vs. positive). 
 Across five studies, employing different operationalisations of power and context, 
power elevated mood at baseline/in neutral contexts and in positive contexts, but not in 
negative contexts. Overall, power also increased variability in mood between contexts of 
opposing valence (negative vs. positive). However, some effects were marginally significant 
(e.g., effect of high [vs. medium/control] power on variability) and many only emerged at the 
meta-level, suggesting that the observed effects may not arise in all samples and may not 
capture a number of additional important variables.  
Broadly speaking, the findings are consistent with the view that power elevates mood 
(Keltner et al., 2003), and increases variability in mood (Guinote, 2007a). Crucially though, 
the results highlight the importance of contextual factors, providing important indications of 
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 APPENDIX 
A.1. Excluded Participants  
Table A1. 
Excluded participants by sample and with supporting information. 
Sample Question Participant # Participant Response 
Study 3  
  
 What do you think is the hypothesis that is being tested in this study?  
  1 When feeling powerful do your feelings change less when listening to different types of music 
  2 There is a positive correlation between music and emotion 
  3 How music can impact mood and specifically, the type of music which can impact mood. 
  4 The effect of situational power over control of externally influenced emotions. 
  5 Testing to see how levels of control reflect attitudes to music and social life. 
  6 Whether a particular mindset/mood effects opinion of music. 
  7 how power affects perception of music 
  8 How being primed as powerful can influence the emotions attached to music 
  
9 If you describe an instance when you have a lot of control, then it will be harder to be influenced by different 
types of music? Whether possibly in another condition you have to describe an instance where you had less 
control and after that the music influences you more? 
  10 If feelings of power are related to emotional experiences of music. 
  11 How music affects mood 
  12 How being in control effects your feelings towards music 
  13 Participants will be more emotionally influenced by the music if they are made to feel powerful 
  14 How music makes you feel compared to how you feel in power 




    
  
16 Whether different types of music can make us feel more powerful and in control. Perhaps a more controlling 
person will respond differently to the types of music that raise heartrate and make you feel more excited? 
  17 Possibly concerning the effect that soul (or one of the other questions about the music) has on mood 
  18 power will affect participant's mood after listening to music 
 What do you think was the purpose of recalling the event? 
  1 To have try a trigger negative feelings to start with. 
  2 To make you feel an emotions to do with powerlessness 
  
3 To prime an experimental condition of either feeling in control or not based on the description of the experience 
and whether it left you feeling in control or not 
  4 To elicit sense of control. 
  
5 To recall an emotion that led us to feel in control and powerful, for the purpose of emotion in the music 
conditions. 
  6 To recreate a particular mood, eg. make participant feel powerful. 
  7 to put me in a high power frame of mind 
  8 To prime the participant to a condition (powerful) 
  9 To prime you into feeling in control or not....? 
  10 To create/replicate a feeling of power for the participant. 
  11 to create strong feelings of power 
  12 It changes your perception of music 
  13 To make the participant feel powerful, which might affect how they react to the music. 
  14 place yourself in a high power mind set 
  15 To test whether recall of a situation of power would influence how you reponded to the different types of music 
  16 To put us in a position where we are thinking about being powerful and having control 
  17 Perhaps to ensure everyone was in the same 'powerful' mood to begin with 
  18 to get the participant in a powerful or non powerful state of mind 




    
  1 To trigger different feelings 
  2 To instill a certain mood and emotion 
  
3 To assess whether and to what extent the musical extracts could affect the feeling of control or otherwise 
established through the prime. 
  4 To influence the emotions. 
  5 To see how different sources of music reflect different perceptions into emotion 
  6 To find out response to different styles and genres of music. 
  7 to evaluate them 
  8 To excite some kind of emotion or impression 
  
9 To see if you are easily influenced? And possibly because there were so many to see if you got less positive 
throughout the task. 
  10 To influence the emotional state of the participant. 
  11 to distuiguish the feelings that music emerges 
  12 Mood stimuli 
  13 To make the participants feel different emotions 
  14 see if the music changed your mood 
  15 To test how they were differently responded to 
  16 To see how music may affect our emotions, either raising levels of excitement or calming us down 
  17 To manipulate mood 
  18 to alter the participant's mood 
Study 4  
  
 What do you think is the hypothesis that is being tested in this study? 
  1 The presence of an appointed authoritative figure and its influences on perception. 
  2 Effect of prior information and assumptions on human behaviour 
  3 The gorier the images the more excitement will be evoke from the participant. 




    
 What do you think was the purpose of the virtual committee? 
  1 To further the guise of having to interact with others. 
  
2 To see how I would act when talking to someone in an imaginary inferior position than I was in the virtual 
committee, when in reality there was nobody there. 
  3 To fool you. 
  4 to see how i reacted feeling below someone else 
 What do you think was the purpose of the images? 
  1 To gauge perception. 
  
2 One odd option would be to make me forget about the so called other participant and the texts about the three 
candidates in the virtual committee simulation, which could then be used to observe memory and reaction based 
on the short 1 minute per text read 
  3 To fool you 
  
4 what muscles we may use or move when seeing emotion stimulating pictures as in what our physical response 
would be depending on an emotional picture. the pictures were obviously emotion stirring so to measure the 





    
Table A2. 
Study 3: Comparisons of effect sizes, derived from multi-level models, when including (vs. excluding) participants who correctly identified the aim of the 
study (nexcluded = 18)  
   Context   
 Negative  Baseline/Neutral  Positive 
 Coeff. SE r  Coeff. SE r  Coeff. SE r 
 Suspicious Participants Included 
High (vs. Medium) Power 0.16 0.17 .07  -0.02 0.22 -.00  0.05 0.14 .02 
Low (vs. Medium) Power -0.18 0.16 -.08  -0.57 0.22 -.07  -0.31 0.13 -.16 
 Suspicious Participants Excluded 
High (vs. Medium) Power 0.20 0.16 .09  0.14 0.21 .02  0.02 0.13 .01 





    
Table A3. 
Study 4: Comparisons of effect sizes, derived from multi-level models, when including (vs. excluding) participants who correctly identified the aims of the 
study (nexcluded = 4) 
   Context   
 Negative  Baseline/Neutral  Positive 
 Coeff. SE r  Coeff. SE r  Coeff. SE r 
 Suspicious Participants Included 
High (vs. Medium) Power 0.03 0.16 .01  0.10 0.09 .09  0.30 0.12 .19 
Low (vs. Medium) Power 0.20 0.16 .09  0.06 0.12 .05  0.00 0.12 .00 
 Suspicious Participants Excluded 
High (vs. Medium) Power 0.07 0.16 .03  0.26 0.17 .09  0.26 0.15 .13 





    
A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table A4. 
Study 1a: Means, standard deviations and sample sizes for mood by power (high, medium, low) and context (negative, baseline, positive). 
   Context   
 Negative  Baseline  Positive 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n  Mean SD n 
High Power .72 1.23 68  1.29 0.88 68  2.03 0.97 68 
Medium Power .22 0.96 65  0.95 0.86 65  1.85 0.95 65 
Low Power .19 1.20 63  0.56 1.29 63  1.52 1.07 63 
 
Table A5. 
Study 1b: Means, standard deviations and sample sizes for mood by power (high, medium, low) and context (negative, baseline, positive). 
   Context   
 Negative  Baseline  Positive 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n  Mean SD n 
High Power 2.00 0.79 91  5.72 1.03 91  6.15 1.24 91 
Medium Power 2.21 0.87 98  5.20 0.96 98  5.87 1.30 98 





    
Table A6. 
Study 2: Means, standard deviations and sample sizes for mood by power (high, medium, low) and context (negative, baseline, positive). 
   Context   
 Negative  Baseline  Positive 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n  Mean SD n 
High Power 4.55 1.28 31  4.94 1.07 64  5.26 1.15 32 
Medium Power 4.44 1.26 27  4.89 1.12 63  4.79 1.15 29 






    
Table A7. 
Study 3: Means, standard deviations and sample sizes for mood by power (high, control, low) and context (negative, neutral, positive). 
   Context   
 Negative  Neutral  Positive 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n  Mean SD n 
High Power 4.56 1.61 58  5.74 1.56 58  6.19 1.47 58 
Control Power 4.40 1.55 68  5.76 1.43 68  6.14 1.44 68 
Low Power 4.22 1.51 71  5.20 1.37 71  5.83 1.52 71 
 
Table A8. 
Study 4: Means, standard deviations and sample sizes for mood by power (high, control, low) and context (negative, neutral, positive). 
   Context   
 Negative  Neutral  Positive 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n  Mean SD n 
High Power 2.66 1.42 63  5.17 0.89 63  6.96 1.33 63 
Control Power 2.64 1.41 60  5.07 0.90 60  6.66 1.46 60 






    
Table A9. 
Study 4: Means, standard deviations and sample sizes for zygomatic activation ȝ9by power (high, control, low) and context (negative, neutral, positive). 
   Context   
 Negative  Neutral  Positive 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n  Mean SD n 
High Power 0.04 1.04 63  0.12 1.11 63  0.89 2.66 63 
Control Power 0.01 1.38 60  0.12 1.52 60  0.64 2.42 60 
Low Power -0.07 1.12 61  0.05 1.07 61  0.83 2.78 61 
 
Table A10. 
Study 4: Means, standard deviations and sample sizes for corrugator activation ȝ9by power (high, control, low) and context (negative, neutral, positive). 
   Context   
 Negative  Neutral  Positive 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n  Mean SD n 
High Power 0.40 1.49 63  0.07 1.02 63  -0.05 0.80 63 
Control Power 0.24 1.08 60  -0.04 0.82 60  -0.06 0.85 60 





Studies 1-4: Feelings of power in low, medium/controls and high power groups.  
 Power  
Sample Low Medium/Control High Power main effect 
   Study 1a 3.43a(0.66) 4.58b(0.21) 5.54c(0.44) F(2, 193) = 327.51, p < .001, Șp2 = .77 
   Study 1b 3.30a(0.75) 4.77b(0.33) 5.92c(0.41) F(2, 272) = 564.56, p < .001, Șp2 = .81 
   Study 2 3.67a(0.52) 4.56b(0.18) 5.36c(0.41) F(2, 187) = 286.76, p < .001, Șp2 = .75 
   Study 3 2.60a(1.40) 4.46b(1.68) 7.57c(1.08) F(2, 194) = 193.21, p < .001, Șp2 = .67 
   Study 4 3.54a(1.51) 5.06b(1.07) 7.51c(1.17) F(2, 181) = 156.17, p < .001, Șp2 = .63 
NB: Observed means and standard deviations in parentheses. Higher values indicate greater 







A.3. Multi-level Models Probing Power in Positive and Negative Contexts 
Table A12. 
Studies 1a and 1b: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power in positive contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 3.60*** 0.48 2.60 4.59   3.81*** 0.44 2.86 4.76 14.17 8.60 .92 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.30*** 0.08 0.14 0.46 782.41 3.67 .13 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)      -0.25** 0.08 -0.42 -0.09 781.75 -3.06 -.11 
D3: Baseline (1=baseline, 0=positive)      -0.73 0.74 -2.31 0.86 14.08 -0.98 -.25 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=positive)      -2.57** 0.63 -3.91 -1.22 14.13 -4.09 -.74 
 D1xD3: High Power x Baseline       0.14 0.12 -0.10 0.39 601.23 1.15 .05 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.25* 0.11 -0.47 -0.04 645.82 -2.30 -.09 
D2xD3: Low Power x Baseline      -0.57*** 0.13 -0.82 -0.33 600.45 -4.57 -.18 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.22 0.11 0.00 0.44 643.92 1.95 .08 
Fixed Effects (Study)                  
Study      -2.06*** 0.44 -3.01 -1.12 14.08 -4.66 -.78 
Study x High Power       0.04 0.07 -0.10 0.18 458.62 0.58 .03 
Study x Low Power       0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.21 458.81 1.03 .05 
Study x Baseline      -0.01 0.73 -1.58 1.57 13.82 -0.01 -.00 
Study x Negative Context       1.16 0.62 -0.18 2.50 13.85 1.86 .45 
Study x High Power x Baseline      -0.02 0.13 -0.27 0.23 649.78 -0.17 -.01 
Study x High Power x Negative Context       0.42*** 0.12 0.19 0.65 845.22 3.56 .02 
Study x Low Power x Baseline       0.42** 0.13 0.17 0.67 649.83 3.25 .03 
Study x Low Power x Negative Context       0.04 0.12 -0.19 0.28 845.78 0.37 .01 
Variance Components            





Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.23*** 0.03 0.18 0.30   0.18*** 0.03 0.14 0.24 - - - 
Stimuli 4.53** 1.43 2.43 8.43   0.69** 0.26 0.32 1.45 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Baseline  0.62*** 0.08 0.48 0.80   0.44*** 0.07 0.32 0.61 - - - 
Negative Context  0.39*** 0.06 0.29 0.54   0.36*** 0.06 0.26 0.50 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 5370.79(6)   5218.03(23) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from medium power in positive contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, 
whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded virtually 







Studies 1a and 1b: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power in negative contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 3.60*** 0.48 2.60 4.59   1.25* 0.44 0.30 2.20 14.13 2.83 .60 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.03 0.09 -0.14 0.20 877.81 0.36 .01 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)      -0.02 0.09 -0.20 0.15 877.95 -0.29 -.01 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       2.56** 0.62 1.22 3.89 14.00 4.10 .74 
D4: Baseline (1=baseline, 0=negative)       1.83* 0.74 0.26 3.41 14.02 2.49 .55 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.29* 0.10 0.09 0.49 783.93 2.81 .10 
D1xD4: High Power x Baseline       0.42** 0.13 0.17 0.68 652.66 3.30 .13 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context      -0.23* 0.11 -0.44 -0.03 781.56 -2.20 -.08 
D2xD4: Low Power x Baseline      -0.80*** 0.13 -1.06 -0.55 652.20 -6.15 -.23 
Fixed Effects (Study)            
Study      -0.93 0.44 -1.88 0.01 14.01 -2.11 -.49 
Study x High Power       0.12 0.07 -0.02 0.25 451.19 1.67 .08 
Study x Low Power       0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.22 451.47 1.16 .05 
Study x Positive Context      -1.17 0.73 -2.74 0.40 13.75 -1.59 -.40 
Study x Baseline      -1.16 0.62 -2.49 0.17 13.75 -1.87 -.45 
Study x High Power x Positive Context      -0.42*** 0.11 -0.64 -0.20 1003.04 -3.67 -.01 
Study x High Power x Baseline      -0.44** 0.13 -0.70 -0.19 698.17 -3.38 -.01 
Study x Low Power x Positive Context      -0.05 0.12 -0.28 0.18 1003.55 -0.40 -.01 
Study x Low Power x Baseline       0.37** 0.13 0.11 0.63 698.45 2.79 .02 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.46*** 0.03 0.41 0.52   0.47*** 0.03 0.42 0.53 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.23*** 0.03 0.18 0.30   0.18*** 0.03 0.14 0.24 - - - 





Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.62*** 0.08 0.48 0.80   0.44*** 0.07 0.32 0.61 - - - 
Baseline  0.39*** 0.06 0.29 0.54   0.36*** 0.06 0.26 0.50 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 5420.22(6)   5218.03(23) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from medium power in negative contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, 
whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded virtually 






Study 2: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power in positive contexts providing the reference category. Crucial hypothesis tests 
are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 4.82*** 0.04 4.74 4.94   4.89*** 0.11 4.66 5.11 660.46 43.09 .86 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)       0.33* 0.16 0.01 0.65 614.18 2.05 .08 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)       0.06 0.17 -0.27 0.40 753.78 0.37 .01 
D3: Neutral Context (1=neutral, 0=positive)      -0.02 0.11 -0.24 0.19 382.50 -0.23 -.01 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=positive)      -0.36* 0.16 -0.69 -0.04 130.17 -2.20 -.19 
 D1xD3: High Power x Neutral Context      -0.23 0.15 -0.53 0.07 357.20 -1.52 -.08 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.34 0.23 -0.79 0.11 125.37 -1.50 -.13 
D2xD3: Low Power x Neutral Context      -0.33* 0.16 -0.65 -0.01 427.84 -2.00 -.10 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.10 0.25 -0.40 0.59 122.31 0.38 .03 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.89*** 0.03 0.83 0.95   0.88*** 0.03 0.83 0.94 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.24*** 0.05 0.17 0.36   0.24*** 0.05 0.16 0.35 - - - 
Stimuli 0.15*** 0.03 0.11 0.21   0.16*** 0.03 0.11 0.21 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Neutral Context  0.07 0.04 0.02 0.24   0.06 0.04 0.01 0.25 - - - 
Negative Context  0.32** 0.11 0.16 0.64   0.21* 0.09 0.09 0.51 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 9142.63(6)   9124.70(14) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from medium power in positive contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, 
whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded virtually 






Study 2: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium power in negative contexts providing the reference category. Crucial hypothesis 
tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 4.80*** 0.04 4.71 4.89   4.53*** 0.13 4.27 4.79 1105.23 34.17 .72 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium)      -0.02 0.18 -0.38 0.34 939.18 -0.12 -.00 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium)       0.16 0.20 -0.22 0.55 1149.94 0.82 .02 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       0.36* 0.14 0.07 0.64 292.19 2.48 .14 
D4: Neutral Context (1=neutral, 0=negative)       0.33* 0.13 0.08 0.58 692.63 2.60 .10 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.35* 0.20 -0.04 0.74 257.87 1.78 .11 
D1xD4: High Power x Neutral Context       0.12 0.17 -0.22 0.46 588.56 0.70 .03 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context      -0.10 0.21 -0.52 0.33 275.32 -0.45 -.03 
D2xD4: Low Power x Neutral Context      -0.43* 0.19 -0.80 -0.05 693.04 -2.25 -.09 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.90*** 0.03 0.85 0.96   0.89*** 0.03 0.84 0.96 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.25*** 0.05 0.17 0.36   0.25*** 0.05 0.17 0.36 - - - 
Stimuli 0.15*** 0.03 0.11 0.21   0.15*** 0.03 0.11 0.21 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.08 0.06 0.02 0.34   0.03 0.05 0.00 0.76 - - - 
Neutral Context  0.07 0.04 0.02 0.23   0.06 0.04 0.01 0.24 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 9158.32(6)   9133.72 (14) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from medium power in negative contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, 







Studies 3 and 4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with control power in positive contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 5.02*** 0.17 4.67 5.37   6.40*** 0.11 6.19 6.61 147.38 60.51 .98 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=control)       0.17 0.09 -0.01 0.35 377.55 1.90 .10 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=control)      -0.16 0.09 -0.33 0.02 376.83 -1.76 -.09 
D3: Neutral Context (1=neutral, 0=positive)      -1.00*** 0.26 -1.51 -0.49 77.58 -3.92 -.41 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=positive)      -2.89*** 0.16 -3.21 -2.57 191.60 -17.83 -.79 
 D1xD3: High Power x Neutral Context      -0.16 0.11 -0.37 0.06 248.86 -1.46 -.09 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.08 0.16 -0.39 0.23 381.12 -0.52 -.03 
D2xD3: Low Power x Neutral Context      -0.03 0.11 -0.24 0.19 257.19 -0.24 -.02 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.17 0.15 -0.14 0.47 381.63 1.08 .06 
Fixed Effects (Study)            
Study      -0.26* 0.11 -0.47 -0.05 146.03 -2.43 -.20 
Study x High Power      -0.11 0.09 -0.29 0.07 362.18 -1.22 -.06 
Study x Low Power      -0.17 0.09 -0.34 0.00 361.27 -1.93 -.10 
Study x Neutral Context       0.57* 0.25 0.07 1.06 68.80 2.29 .27 
Study x Negative Context       1.19*** 0.14 0.92 1.46 102.60 8.78 .65 
Study x High Power x Neutral Context       0.06 0.13 -0.19 0.31 742.84 0.45 .02 
Study x High Power x Negative Context       0.19 0.16 -0.12 0.50 379.18 1.20 .06 
Study x Low Power x Neutral Context      -0.16 0.12 -0.40 0.08 703.42 -1.28 -.05 
Study x Low Power x Negative Context      -0.03 0.15 -0.33 0.27 378.55 -0.20 -.01 
Variance Components            
Residual 1.09*** 0.01 1.06 1.11   1.09*** 0.01 1.06 1.11 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.45*** 0.04 0.38 0.54   0.44*** 0.04 0.37 0.52 - - - 





Random Slope Variance            
Neutral Context  0.35*** 0.05 0.26 0.47   0.34*** 0.05 0.26 0.46 - - - 
Negative Context  1.39*** 0.11 1.18 1.63   1.38*** 0.11 1.17 1.61 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 42590.83(6)   42427.95(23) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from control power in positive contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, 
whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded virtually 







Studies 3 and 4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with control power in negative contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 3.60*** 0.48 2.60 4.59   3.52*** 0.12 3.28 3.75 201.94 30.10 .90 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=control)       0.09 0.12 -0.14 0.32 372.98 0.80 .04 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=control)       0.01 0.11 -0.21 0.23 372.47 0.09 .00 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       2.89*** 0.16 2.57 3.21 190.67 17.84 .79 
D4: Neutral Context (1=neutral, 0=negative)       1.88*** 0.26 1.35 2.40 86.40 7.12 .61 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.08 0.16 -0.23 0.39 377.46 0.53 .03 
D1xD4: High Power x Neutral Context      -0.01 0.14 -0.29 0.27 295.71 -0.06 .00 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context      -0.16 0.15 -0.46 0.14 377.96 -1.07 .05 
D2xD4: Low Power x Neutral Context      -0.23 0.14 -0.50 0.05 304.75 -1.63 .09 
Fixed Effects (Study)            
Study       0.89*** 0.12 0.66 1.12 200.67 7.62 .47 
Study x High Power       0.05 0.12 -0.18 0.28 365.06 0.43 .02 
Study x Low Power      -0.19 0.11 -0.41 0.03 364.52 -1.71 .09 
Study x Positive Context      -0.62 0.25 -1.12 -0.12 71.29 -2.46 .28 
Study x Ba Neutral Context      -1.19*** 0.14 -1.46 -0.92 102.36 -8.78 .66 
Study x High Power x Positive Context      -0.19 0.16 -0.50 0.12 375.48 -1.21 -.06 
Study x High Power x Neutral Context      -0.13 0.15 -0.43 0.17 494.26 -0.87 -.04 
Study x Low Power x Positive Context       0.03 0.15 -0.27 0.33 374.85 0.20 .01 
Study x Low Power x Neutral Context      -0.13 0.15 -0.41 0.16 475.66 -0.86 -.04 
Variance Components            
Residual 0.46*** 0.03 0.41 0.52   0.47*** 0.03 0.42 0.53 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.23*** 0.03 0.18 0.30   0.18*** 0.03 0.14 0.24 - - - 





Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.62*** 0.08 0.48 0.80   0.44*** 0.07 0.32 0.61 - - - 
Neutral Context  0.39*** 0.06 0.29 0.54   0.36*** 0.06 0.26 0.50 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 5420.22(6)   5218.03(23) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Coefficients for the low- and high-power dummy variables (highlighted in bold) denote 
deviations from control power in negative contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, 
whereas regression coefficients are based on restricted estimates (REML; see Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Both methods yielded virtually 






Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium/control power in positive contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 4.15*** 0.66 1.98 6.33   4.46*** 0.72 2.34 6.57 3.49 6.21 .96 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium/control)       0.24*** 0.06 0.13 0.35 1338.84 4.18 .11 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium/control)      -0.20*** 0.06 -0.32 -0.09 1314.30 -3.58 -.10 
 D3: Baseline/Neutral (1=base/neu, 0=positive)      -0.06 0.12 -0.30 0.18 1422.29 -0.52 -.01 
 D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=positive)      -0.98*** 0.15 -1.26 -0.69 1094.60 -6.70 -.20 
 D1xD3: High Power x Baseline/Neutral      -0.09 0.08 -0.24 0.06 730.34 -1.17 -.04 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.16 0.10 -0.35 0.02 1151.35 -1.73 -.05 
D2xD3: Low Power x Baseline/Neutral      -0.18* 0.08 -0.33 -0.03 741.77 -2.33 -.09 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.18 0.09 -0.01 0.36 1122.60 1.88 .06 
Variance Components            
Residual 1.04*** 0.01 1.02 1.06   1.04*** 0.01 1.01 1.06 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.31*** 0.02 0.27 0.35   0.29*** 0.02 0.26 0.33 - - - 
Stimuli 2.43*** 0.37 1.81 3.27   1.38*** 0.25 0.97 1.98 - - - 
Study 1.89 1.81 0.29 12.33   2.38 1.95 0.48 11.82 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Baseline/Neutral  0.24*** 0.03 0.18 0.31   0.24*** 0.03 0.18 0.30 - - - 
Negative Context  0.87*** 0.05 0.77 0.98   0.87*** 0.05 0.77 0.98 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 55106.16(7)   55013.91(14) 
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deviations from medium/control power in positive contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) 






Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with medium/control power in negative contexts providing the reference category. Crucial 
hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 4.18*** 0.55 2.41 5.95   3.57* 0.71 1.47 5.68 3.44 5.02 .94 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=medium/control)       0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.21 1327.57 1.17 .03 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=medium/control)      -0.03 0.07 -0.16 0.10 1304.15 -0.50 -.01 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)       0.91*** 0.14 0.63 1.19 1310.72 6.38 .17 
D4: Baseline/Neutral (1=base/neu, 0=negative)       0.67*** 0.15 0.39 0.96 1429.30 4.59 .12 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.16 0.09 -0.02 0.34 1174.44 1.76 .05 
D1xD4: High Power x Baseline/Neutral       0.11 0.09 -0.06 0.29 927.30 1.24 .04 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context      -0.16 0.09 -0.34 0.02 1143.12 -1.73 -.05 
D2xD4: Low Power x Baseline/Neutral      -0.40*** 0.09 -0.57 -0.22 936.59 -4.49 -.15 
Variance Components            
Residual 1.04*** 0.01 1.02 1.07   1.04*** 0.01 1.02 1.06 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.44*** 0.03 0.39 0.50   0.44*** 0.03 0.39 0.49 - - - 
Stimuli 2.46*** 0.37 1.83 3.31   1.46*** 0.26 1.03 2.07 - - - 
Study 1.23 1.21 0.18 8.51   2.32 1.93 0.46 11.79 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.79*** 0.05 0.70 0.89   0.78*** 0.05 0.69 0.89 - - - 
Baseline/Neutral  0.45*** 0.04 0.37 0.55   0.44*** 0.04 0.36 0.53 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number  of parameters) 55576.92(7)   55505.34(14) 
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deviations from medium/control power in negative contexts. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) 





A.4. Multi-level Model Probing Differences in the Effects of Power in Study 1-2 vs. Study 3-4 
Table A20. 
Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with control power in neutral contexts providing the reference category. Study coefficients 
represent Studies 1-2 (-1) vs. Studies 3-4 (1). Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high and low power, and high and low power 
x context interactions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects (Power & Context)            
Intercept 5.00*** 0.18 4.65 5.35   4.64*** 0.18 4.28 5.00 104.64 25.58 .93 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=control)       0.13* 0.06 0.01 0.25 1231.32 2.13 .06 
 D2: Low Power (1=low, 0=control)      -0.33*** 0.06 -0.44 -0.21 1164.55 -5.55 -.16 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=base/neu)       0.60** 0.18 0.23 0.96 121.80 3.24 .28 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=base/neu)      -1.19*** 0.19 -1.57 -0.81 137.73 -6.22 -.47 
 D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context       0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.26 2375.46 1.29 .03 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context      -0.08 0.09 -0.26 0.10 1818.93 -0.86 -.02 
D2xD3: Low Power x Positive Context       0.16 0.08 0.00 0.32 2376.83 1.94 .04 
D2xD4: Low Power x Negative Context       0.34*** 0.09 0.15 0.52 1835.38 3.61 .08 
Fixed Effects (Study)            
Study       0.52** 0.18 0.16 0.88 104.64 2.87 .27 
Study x High Power      -0.06 0.06 -0.18 0.05 1231.32 -1.07 -.03 
Study x Low Power       0.23*** 0.06 0.12 0.35 1164.55 3.92 .11 
Study x Positive Context       0.69*** 0.18 0.33 1.06 121.80 3.75 .32 
Study x Negative Context      -0.57** 0.19 -0.95 -0.20 137.73 -3.00 -.25 
Study x High Power x Positive Context       0.00 0.08 -0.16 0.16 2375.46 0.01 .00 
Study x High Power x Negative Context       0.10 0.09 -0.08 0.28 1818.93 1.06 .02 
Study x Low Power x Positive Context      -0.23** 0.08 -0.38 -0.07 2376.83 -2.78 -.06 
Study x Low Power x Negative Context      -0.24** 0.09 -0.43 -0.06 1835.38 -2.59 -.06 





Residual 1.04*** 0.01 1.01 1.06   1.03*** 0.01 1.01 1.05 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance            
Participant  0.21*** 0.02 0.18 0.25   0.20*** 0.02 0.17 0.24 - - - 
Stimuli 2.45*** 0.37 1.82 3.29   1.20*** 0.18 0.89 1.62 - - - 
Random Slope Variance            
Positive Context  0.31*** 0.03 0.26 0.36   0.30*** 0.03 0.25 0.36 - - - 
Negative Context  0.60*** 0.04 0.53 0.69   0.60*** 0.04 0.53 0.69 - - - 
Fit Statistics            
ML deviance (number of parameters) 54814.81(6)   54681.81(23) 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, p < .10. Fit indices and model comparisons are based on maximum likelihood (ML) estimates, whereas 







A.5. Multi-level Models Probing High vs. Low Power 
Table A21. 
Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with low power at baseline/in neutral contexts providing the reference category, and 
excluding responses from medium power/control participants. Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high (vs. low) power. 
 Model 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept   3.97** 0.73 1.88 6.06 3.70 5.44 .94 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=low)   0.42*** 0.06 0.30 0.54 823.77 6.89 .23 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=base/neu)   0.56*** 0.14 0.29 0.83 752.17 4.06 .15 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=base/neu)  -0.78*** 0.16 -1.08 -0.47 590.90 -4.97 .20 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context   0.02 0.08 -0.13 0.18 888.53 0.28 .01 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context  -0.31** 0.09 -0.49 -0.12 863.44 -3.27 .11 
Variance Components        
Residual   1.03*** 0.01 1.00 1.06 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance        
Participant   0.23*** 0.02 0.19 0.28 - - - 
Stimuli   0.97*** 0.20 0.65 1.46 - - - 
Study   2.49 1.95 0.54 11.55 - - - 
Random Slope Variance        
Positive Context   0.32*** 0.03 0.26 0.40 - - - 
Negative Context   0.66*** 0.06 0.55 0.78 - - - 
1%SSSS .10. Coefficients for the high-power dummy variable (highlighted in bold) denote deviations from 








Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with low power in positive contexts providing the reference category, and excluding responses 
from medium power/control participants. Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high (vs. low) power. 
 Model 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept   4.48** 0.73 2.38 6.57 3.68 6.13 .95 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=low)   0.44*** 0.06 0.32 0.55 835.86 7.38 .25 
D3: Baseline/Neutral (1=base/neu, 0=positive)  -0.48** 0.14 -0.76 -0.20 700.05 -3.39 .13 
D4: Negative Context (1=negative, 0=positive)  -1.31*** 0.16 -1.62 -0.99 383.46 -8.19 .39 
D1xD3: High Power x Baseline/Neutral   0.11 0.08 -0.05 0.27 494.24 1.40 .06 
D1xD4: High Power x Negative Context  -0.33*** 0.10 -0.52 -0.14 701.13 -3.34 .13 
Variance Components        
Residual   1.03*** 0.01 1.00 1.06 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance        
Participant   0.31*** 0.03 0.27 0.37 - - - 
Stimuli   0.99*** 0.20 0.66 1.47 - - - 
Study   2.51 1.96 0.54 11.62 - - - 
Random Slope Variance        
Baseline/Neutral   0.30*** 0.04 0.22 0.40 - - - 
Negative Context   0.95*** 0.07 0.81 1.10 - - - 
1%SSSSCoefficients for the high-power dummy variable (highlighted in bold) denote deviations from 






Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, with low power in negative contexts providing the reference category, and excluding 
responses from medium power/control participants. Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: simple effects of high (vs. low) power. 
 Model 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept   3.33* 0.72 1.24 5.43 3.62 4.61 .92 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=low)   0.11 0.07 -0.02 0.25 836.63 1.63 .06 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)   1.19*** 0.16 0.87 1.50 475.57 7.42 .32 
D4: Baseline/Neutral (1=base/neu, 0=negative)   0.41* 0.17 0.08 0.74 638.13 2.44 .10 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context   0.31** 0.10 0.13 0.50 726.72 3.28 .12 
D1xD4: High Power x Baseline/Neutral   0.52*** 0.09 0.34 0.70 600.07 5.59 .22 
Variance Components        
Residual   1.03*** 0.01 1.01 1.06 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance        
Participant   0.47*** 0.03 0.41 0.54 - - - 
Stimuli   1.12*** 0.22 0.76 1.64 - - - 
Study   2.44 1.94 0.51 11.62 - - - 
Random Slope Variance        
Positive Context   0.85*** 0.07 0.73 0.99 - - - 
Baseline/Neutral   0.52*** 0.06 0.41 0.65 - - - 
1%SSSSCoefficients for the high-power dummy variable (highlighted in bold) denote deviations from 









Studies 1-4: Multi-level model predicting variations in mood, excluding responses from medium power/control participants, and responses at baseline/in 
neutral contexts. Crucial hypothesis tests are highlighted in bold: interactions between high (vs. low) power and positive (vs. negative) contexts. 
 Model 
Model 2 Parameter Coeff. SE 95% CI df t r 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept   2.46* 0.71 0.42 4.50 3.74 3.44 .87 
D1: High Power (1=high, 0=low)   0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.23 718.89 1.10 .04 
D3: Positive Context (1=positive, 0=negative)   2.88*** 0.20 2.48 3.27 82.99 14.35 .84 
D1xD3: High Power x Positive Context   0.37*** 0.10 0.17 0.56 749.93 3.71 .13 
Variance Components        
Residual   1.13*** 0.02 1.09 1.17 - - - 
Random Intercept Variance        
Participant   0.53*** 0.04 0.46 0.62 - - - 
Stimuli   0.66*** 0.12 0.47 0.94 - - - 
Study   2.35 1.86 0.50 11.10 - - - 
Random Slope Variance        
Positive Context   0.90*** 0.07 0.77 1.04 - - - 
NB: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < SCoefficients for the interaction between high-power and positive context dummy variables 




A.6. List of Stimuli 
Table A25. 
Study 1b: Imagined contexts 
Valence # Stimulus 
Negative   
 1 You have been sued for negligence. 
 2 You are splitting up from your spouse. 
 3 You have lost a considerable amount of money playing poker. 
 4 You join the gym but fail to lose any weight. 
 5 Your bike has been stolen. 
 6 Your mortgage application has been denied. 
 7 Your house has halved in value over the last five years. 
 8 You score in the bottom 10% of your class in an exam. 
Positive   
 1 You buy a pair of shoes you like. 
 2 You have inherited a considerable sum of money. 
 3 You have been promoted. 
 4 You get a free upgrade to business class on your flight. 
 5 You have been given a clean bill of health by your doctor. 
 6 You write a best-selling book. 
 7 Your work contract is renewed. 








Study 3: Music excerpts 
Valence # Stimulus 
Negative   
 1 Street Killer - Terry Devine-King 
 2 Pouncer  - Christopher Slaski 
 3 Pursuit  - Chris Blackwell 
 4 Meteor  - Nick Ingman / Terry Devine-King 
 5 Scattered Ashes  - Igor Dvorkin / Duncan Pittock 
 6 Pure Dark  - David O'Brien 
 7 Apart  - Paul Mottram 
 8 Flooded  - Evelyn Glennie 
 9 Frozen Time  - Terry Devine-King / Evelyn Glennie 
 10 Lethal Injection  - Oliver Ledbury 
 11 Night Escape  - Orlando Jopling 
 12 Winter Woods  - Oliver Ledbury 
Neutral   
 1 Losing Your Winter Fur  - Sue Verran / Tom Quick 
Positive   
 1 Heroes Return - Luke Richards 
 2 Heroic Destiny  - Tim Devine / Daniel Warner 
 3 Upside Stride  - Dave Hartley 
 4 Shout  - Kes Loy 
 5 Nicky Romero & Anouk - Feet On The Ground 
 6 Afternoon Haze  - Paul Mottram 
 7 Frame Of Mind  - Tom Quick 
 8 Beacons  - Richard Lacy / Terl Bryant 
 9 We Are Reckless  - Richard Lacy / Sulene Fleming / David Bird 
 10 Pride  - Patrick Hawes 
 11 Drum Carnage  - Chris Blackwell 







Study 4: International Affective Picture System (IAPS) images 
  Negative   Neutral   Positive 
# Stimulus IAPS 
Identifier 
 Stimulus IAPS 
Identifier 
 Stimulus IAPS 
Identifier 1 Pollution 9342 RollingPin 7000  Nature 5780 
2 Mutilation 3051  Buttons 7001  EroticCouple 4695 
3 Tumor 3261  Towel 7002  Family 2340 
4 StarvingChild 9040  Disk 7003  Family 2154 
5 Burial 9430  Spoon 7004  IceCream 7330 
6 SadChild 2800  Mug 7009  Rollercoaster 8499 
7 CarAccident 9911  Rubberbands 7012  Rafters 8400 
8 Execution 9414  Whistle 7021  Kid 2035 
9 Hospital 3220  Stool 7025  PolarBears 1441 
10 Vomit 9320  Clothespins 7052  Baby 2070 
11 AttackDog 1525  Zipper 7045  Baby 2071 
12 Snake 1120  Mug 7035  Puppies 1710 
13 Attack 6540  Shoes 7032  Pilot 8300 
14 Attack 6563  Puzzle 7061  EroticCouple 4694 
15 Mutilation 3071  Keyring 7059  EroticCouple 4660 







A.7. Stimuli Pre-Test Results 
Table A28. 
Study 1b: Means, standard deviations and inferential statistics for Desirability, Gain/Loss and 
Controllability in the final set of imagined contexts. 
 Negative Positive  
Measure Mean SD Mean SD  
Desirability 1.74 0.74 6.51 0.60 t(149) = 46.53, p < .001 
Gain/Loss 2.14 0.71 6.20 0.61 t(149) = 41.74, p < .001 
Controllability 4.95 1.04 5.25 0.96 t(149) = 2.40, p = .018 
NB: One-hundred and fifty (69 female; Mage = 34.92, SD = 12.41) participants recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk rated 40 events on desirability, controllability and potential 
for gain/loss, from 1 (very undesirable; completely controllable; lose a lot) to 7 (very 








Study 3: Means, standard deviations and inferential statistics for Valence and Arousal for the final 
set of music excerpts. 
 Negative Neutral Positive 
 
Measure Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Main effect 
Valence 3.52a 1.30 5.50b 1.40 6.55c 0.89 F(2, 38) = 41.98, p < .001, Șp2 = .69 
Arousal 4.95a 0.66 3.10b 1.17 4.77a 0.84 F(2, 38) = 42.94, p < .001, Șp2 = .69 
NB: Twenty (18 female, Mage = 19.00, SD = 2.20) students rated 75 music excerpts on 
valence and arousal from 1 (negative; calm) to 9 (positive; excited) using the Self-
Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Means not sharing a common subscript within 







Study 4: Means and standard deviations for Valence and Arousal ratings for the final set of images. 
 Negative  Neutral  Positive  
Measure Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD Main effect 
Valence 2.37a 0.54  5.04b 0.19  7.55c 0.54 F(2, 45) = 481.36, p < .001, Șp2 = .96 
Arousal 5.38a 1.11  3.03b 0.48  5.84a 0.81 F(2, 45) = 48.10, p < .001, Șp2 = .68 
NB: Means and standard deviations are derived from materials accompanying the 
International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). Each image was 
rated on valence and arousal from 1 (negative; calm) to 9 (positive; excited) using the Self-
Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Inferential statistics are calculated by treating 
stimuli (n = 48) as the sampling unit. Means not sharing a common subscript within rows are 
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